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ARTICLES
DOES UBER REDEFINE THE FIRM?
THE POSTINDUSTRIAL CORPORATION AND ADVANCED INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY

Julia Tomassetti*
The popular on-demand ride service, Uber, has become the
exemplar of the platform economy and inspired a new narrative about
advanced information and communication technologies, and the firm.
The narrativetells us that Uberfacilitates a market between independent
businesses and buyers by administeringtechnology that lowers the costs
of exchange. Despite borrowing the language of Coasianfirm theory,
however, the Uber narrative is largely nonsensical within it: Uber
appears much more like a seller of transportationservices than a market
intermediary within a Coasian analysis. By examining disputes over
whether drivers for Uber and its competitor, Lyft, are employees or
independent contractors, this Article shows that the Uber narrative
reveals not technology's dissolution of the firm, but rather a disjuncture
between the firm and its corporateform. While often belied in practice,
major theories of the firm, like that developed by Ronald Coase,
assumed the corporation would be a servant to productive enterprise.
The emergence of the postindustrialcorporation that pursues profit by
other means, including speculative activity and regulatory arbitrage,
poses anotherchallenge to this ideal. The Uber narrativeboth obscures
and legitimates a weakening nexus between the firm and corporation.
This Article hypothesizes several reasons for the Uber narrative's
* JD, PhD. Assistant Professor of Law, City University of Hong Kong. I am indebted to David
Luban for insights that were central to this Article's development. I thank Matt Bodie, Ken DauSchmidt, Michael Harper, and Sanjukta Paul for their helpful commentary on earlier drafts. This
Article has also benefited from feedback at the Georgetown University Law Center Summer
Workshop, the Tenth Annual Colloquium on Scholarship in Employment and Labor Law, the 2016
Spring Colloquium of the Law, Society, & Culture Center at the Indiana University Maurer School
of Law, the 2016 Law & Society Association Annual Meeting, and the 2016 Society for the
Advancement of Socio-Economics Annual Conference and Early Career Workshop.
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appeal, despite its illegibility within Coasian theories of the firm, to
which judges often appear committed in disputes not involving platform
companies. First, the narrative has political valence-it suggests
technology renders the firm obsolete, liberating individual producers.
Second, the narrative conceals the incongruence between Uber's
corporateidentity and organization ofproductive activity by appealing
to the cultural exceptionalism of information and communication
technologies ("ICTs"), and discourses that associate algorithmic
programming with the inscrutability of the market.
Third, the
narrative's appeal reflects the challenge of theorizing service work
under an enduring industrial paradigm.
Finally, ICTs disrupt
assumptions in Coasian theory about the associationoffirm and market
production with the legal relations of property and contract. ICTs
lowered the costs of centralized coordination, orfirm production,.in part
by enabling Uber to control production inputs without acquiring
property rights over them.
I. INTRODUCTION
A new narrative about technology and the firm has become rather
ubiquitous in mainstream and academic discourse about platform
companies. The narrative goes something like this: Advanced ICTs
lower the costs of market exchange so that buyers and sellers can realize
their economic interests without integrating into a firm. Platform
companies use technology to facilitate matches of supply and demand
that transaction costs might otherwise impede.' As its paradigmatic
example, the narrative often points to the on-demand ride service Uber.
In fact, Uber has become almost a metonym for the platform economy. 2
The narrative speaks in the idiom of transaction costs economics
("TCE"), an influential set of theories pioneered by the economist
Ronald Coase that attempt to explain why some economic exchanges
were carried out in markets and others in firms.3 His answer was that
there were costs to market transactions, like searching for information
and negotiating agreements, which would sometimes exceed the costs of

1. E.g., Jon Bruner, Platform Economies: A Conversation with Erik Brynjolfsson & Jon
Bruner, O'RELLY MEDIA INC. (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.oreilly.com/ideas/platform-economies.
2. See infra Part I.B.
3. See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Origin, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 3, 4-5 (1988)
(theorizing that the costs of market transactions sometimes rendered resource allocation within a
firm more efficient).
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organizing economic activity within a firm.4 It then became more
efficient to organize economic activity within the firm.
Yet, what happens if we subject the "Uber narrative" to scrutiny
under Coasian theories of the firm? By lowering transaction costs, does
Uber's technology make the firm obsolete? Is it, as some have
proclaimed, "nothing less than an extinction-level event for the
traditional firm?" 6 Not really. From the perspective of Coasian theory,
the narrative is unintelligible as a description of Uber.'
If the Uber narrative does not actually apply to Uber, then how
should we understand it? And what accounts for the almost taken-forstatus of the narrative as a description of Uber?
This Article explores these questions in the context of disputes over
the legal identity of employment. In particular, this Article focuses on
two high profile class actions in California over whether drivers for Uber
and another on-demand ride service, Lyft, are "employees" or
8
"independent contractors."
Only employees have rights under most statutes regulating work,
9
Only
like anti-discrimination and collective bargaining laws.
employers have obligations under these laws, like paying unemployment
insurance premiums and minimum wages.'o Because hiring workers as
employees is usually more costly than hiring them as "independent
contractors," companies often seek to arbitrate the distinction to avoid
compliance costs." Uber and Lyft's classification of their drivers as

4. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-91 (1937) [hereinafter
Coase, Nature].

5. Id. at 391.
6. Esko Kilpi, The Future of Firms. Is There an App for That? MEDIUM (Feb. 16, 2015),
https:/medium.com/@EskoKilpi/movement-of-thought-that-led-to-airbnb-and-uber-9d4da5e3da3a.
7. See infra Part III.
8. O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Cotter v.
Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
9.

See Pamela A. Izvanariu, Matters Settled but Not Resolved: Worker Misclassification in

the Rideshare Sector (UCLA Inst. for Research on Labor & Emp't, Working Paper No. 2016-20,
2
2016), http://escholarship.org/uc/item/42ql79 z.
10. Noah D. Zatz, Working Beyond the Reach or Grasp ofEmployment Law, in THE GLOVESOFF ECONOMY: WORKPLACE STANDARDS AT THE BoTToM OF AMERICA'S LABOR MARKET 32-33

(Annette Bernhardt et al. eds., 2008).
11. See Robert Habans, Exploring the Costs of Classifying Workers as Independent
Contractors:Four Illustrative Sectors 3 (UCLA Inst. For Research on Labor & Emp't, Working
2015),
Paper,
http://www.irle.ucla.edu/publications/documents/IndependentContractorCost_20151209.pdf;
Independent Contractor MisclassificationImposes Huge Costs on Workers and Federal and State
Treasuries, NAT'L EMP. L. PROJECT (July 2015), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/hidependent-

Contractor-Costs.pdf; Izvanariu, supra note 9, at 5.
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corporation.16

.

independent contractors has generated countless legal disputes, including
at least twenty-eight class actions across the country. 12
In the California class actions, the threshold question regarding the
drivers' employment status turned on the rectitude of the Uber narrative:
Were Uber and Lyft only "technology" companies, as they claimed, or
were they in the business of producing transportation services? 3 Nearly
all of the legal tests for employment status ask the alleged employer to
provide some account of its business identity-what the company is
about and how it does it. 14 Workers in the same business as the alleged
employer are more likely to be employees under the tests. 15
The contest over Uber and Lyft's business identity in the California
class actions suggest that a different notion of business legitimacy is at
work in the Uber narrative than that authorized by Coasian theory:
Rather than articulate the dissolution of the firm, the narrative obscures
and legitimates a weakening relationship between the firm and the
Coase and his followers understood the firm to be a productive
enterprise and assumed that the corporation would be its helpful servant:
Its raison d'8tre was to help the firm maximize profits via the efficient
production and sale of goods and services.
This purpose became so
taken-for-granted that scholars tended to speak of the firm and
corporation interchangeably.1 8
History has long disappointed the ideals of economic theory

12.

Michael J. Bologna, New Wage Payment Class Actions FiledAgainst Uber, BUREAU OF

NAT'L

AFF.,

INC.

(June

29,

2016),

https://convergenceapi.bna.com/ui/content/articleStandalone/245076480000000197/303068?Report
Guid=57E36B2B-FA4E-420D-8F4C-708F9ACDOEB7?emailaddress=ibraryer@winston.com;
Izvanariu, supra note 9, at 2-3 (listing several employment misclassification lawsuits filed against
Uber and Lyft).
13. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1141-42; Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1078.
14. See Izvanariu, supra note 9, at 7-9, 12 (describing federal and state legal tests for
determining employee status which include a factor pertaining to the nature of the employer's
"business").
15. A factor in the common law agency test for determining employment status under many
federal and state statutes is whether or not "the work is part of the regular business of the
employer."

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 220

cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1957); see, e.g.,

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992).
16. See infra Part V.
17. See Reinier Kraakman, THE DURABILITY OF THE CORPORATE FORM in THE TWENTYFIRST-CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

147, 151 (Paul DiMaggio ed., 2001) (explaining that the corporate form helps the firm in "raising
capital, controlling agency costs, facilitating decision-making, and allocating risk among the
participants in the firm").
18. See infra Part IV.
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19
regarding how capitalist production and circulation should work.
Scholars increasingly point to evidence that corporations are operating
according to different principles today than those prescribed by social
scientists.2 0 What this Article tentatively refers to as the "postindustrial"
corporation still seeks to maximize profits, but not necessarily through
productive enterprise. 21 It may pursue shareholder value through asset
manipulation, speculative activity, and regulatory arbitrage and
22
evasion.
We usually examine this phenomenon under the rubric of
financialization-the increasing salience of financial markets in shaping
economic activity, or as part of the shift from "managerial capitalism" to
"investor capitalism." 23 The law often expects companies to comport
themselves according to the ideals of economic theory, making the firm24
Discussions of
corporation nexus a salient issue in commercial law.
special purpose entities, transfer pricing, and proprietary trading, for
25
example, implicate the legitimacy of the postindustrial corporation.
This Article explores how the law addresses the slipping firmcorporation nexus in a new context-employment. Since employment is
the regulatory fulcrum of many important rights and duties, it is a site
where the stakes of the disjuncture are high.26
This Article also examines employment status disputes, as well as
an antitrust suit against Uber, to answer the next question: How does the
Uber narrative work? What accounts for its almost taken-for-granted
status among journalists, academics, and legal decision makers alike?
Coasian understandings of the firm are not confined to the academy, but
27
In many
influence (and reflect) mainstream and legal discourse.
employment disputes, the judge's conception of the alleged employer's
business identity reflects a normative expectation about the firm-

19. See infra Part IV.
20. See Greta R. Krippner, The Financializationof the American Economy, 3 SOCIO-ECON.
REV. 173, 181-82, 199 (2005).
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part V.
23. See Ronald Dore, Financializationof the Global Economy, 17 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE
1097, 1102 (2008); Krippner, supra note 20, at 175.
24. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal:
From Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 783 (2013).
25. E.g., Floyd Norris, Apple's Move Keeps Profit Out of Reach of Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (May
2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/03/business/how-apple-and-other-corporations-moveprofit-to-avoid-taxes.html.
26. See DAVID WElL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME So BAD FOR SO
MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 241 (2014).

27.

See Kilpi, supra note 6.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

5

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3

6

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENTLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 34:1

corporation relationship that was assumed in Coasian theory.2 8 This was
the expectation that a company's business identity should reflect its
organization of productive activity. For example, in a dispute over
whether its delivery drivers were employees or independent contractors,
FedEx claimed that it was not in the package delivery business, but
rather in the business of. operating a "sophisticated information and
distribution network." 2 9 The court rejected the argument, invoking the
lack of congruence that would be implied between FedEx's business
identity on the one hand, and its corporate persona and product markets
on the other: "Without the drivers' delivery services to put FedEx's
information and distribution network to use, FedEx would 'cease to
operate,' at least as the type of entity the public has come to believe it to
be (and which image FedEx has cultivated through its advertising and
public filings)." 30 Acceptance of the Uber narrative does not seem to be
a consequence of the ivory tower failing to communicate with the
outside world.
Two reasons we may be receptive to the Uber narrative involve its
cultural appeal to the exceptionalism of ICTs. . First, the idiom of
advanced information technologies partially obscures the rift-where
arbitrage can flourish-between the company's corporate identity and its
direction of productive activity.' Second, the narrative draws on the
enigma of the algorithm, and in particular, discourses that associate
algorithmic programming with inscrutability and rationality that
transcends human consciousness-much like the neoclassical theory's
awe of the free market.32
Some of the narrative's appeal likely has little to do with
bedazzlement by platform technology. It may be an artifact of the
enduring challenge of theorizing services in the shadow of the industrial
paradigm for how we think about the economy. 33 As a result, we are
more ready to believe that Uber intermediates a market, but a restaurant
does not intermediate a market between buyers of hospitality services
(diners) and sellers (waiters). Most of the features scholars point to as
28. See infra Part V.A.
29. Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 11-1 1094-RGS, 2013 WL 3353776, at
*5 (D. Mass. July 3, 2013), opinion withdrawn in part, 2015 WL 501512 (D. Mass. Feb. 5, 2015),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded 813 F.3d 429 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing FedEx's brief).
30. Id. at *6 (citation omitted).
31. See infta Part V.A.1.
32. See infra Part V.A.2.
33. Cf Veena Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?:Contesting the Dualism ofLegal Worker
Identities, 105 CAL. L. REv. 23 (2017) (businesses have experimented with the obscurities
surrounding employee identity causing an under-theorization of service work).
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evidence of the exceptionalism of platform companies are defining
characteristics of almost all service production.3 4
Finally, assumptions-and ambiguity-within Coasian theory
about the institutional components of market and firm coordination loan
the Uber narrative plausibility.35 ICTs have disturbed assumptions about
the role of legal relations in constituting firms and markets, in particular,
property and contract. 6 Thus, Coasian theory perhaps made itself
vulnerable to a postindustrial reinterpretation of the firm that equates it
with the corporation and formalities of employment.37
In sum, subjecting the Uber narrative to evaluation under Coasian
firm theory suggests several lessons to inform how we think about ICTs,
the corporation, and platform work. Uber is where questions about the
firm-corporation nexus and the use of ICTs to organize production
intersect: Does Uber, as it claims, facilitate a market between
independent transportation businesses and customers by creating
technology that lowers the costs of exchange? 38 In other words, does
Uber redefine the firm or even deliver its epitaph? 39 Or, on the other
hand, is Uber a firm that sells transportation services and hires
employees to produce its services? The Coasian analysis points to the
latter. Uber's technology (as well as its power) appears to have lowered
the costs of firm coordination relative to market coordination by
reducing agency costs and enabling Uber to direct production inputs
without assuming the costs of formal property rights.4 0
The Coasian exercise thus suggests we understand the Uber
narrative as an attempt to legitimize the postindustrial corporation, an
entity whose formal boundaries bear little relation to the organization of
productive activity, an entity that has in large part abstracted itself from
the parochial business of maximizing profit through- the creation and sale
of goods and services.41
34. See infra Part V.B.
35. See Coase, Nature, supra note 4, at 386.
36. Id. at 391.
37. See infra Part V.C.
38. See Joanna Penn and John Wihbey, Uber, Airbnb and Consequences of the Sharing
Economy: Research Roundup, HARV. KENNEDY SHORENSTEIN CTR. ON MEDIA & PUB. POL'Y (last

updated June 3, 2016), http://journalistsresource.org/studies/economics/business/airbnb-lyft-uberbike-share-sharing-economy-research-roundup.
39. See, e.g., Tim O'Reilly, Networks and the Nature of the Firm, MEDIUM (Aug. 14, 2015),
https://medium.com/the-wtf-economy/networks-and-the-nature-of-the-firm-2879Ob6afdcc.

40.

See infra Part V.

41.

See infra Part IV; see also Julia Carrie Wong, Google Wants in on On-Demand; Workers

Want Rights, SF WEEKLY (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.sfweekly.com/sanfrancisco/san-franciscohighly successful
news-google-teamsters-adecco-labor-uber/Content?oid=3906538 ("Many . .

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

7

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3

8

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 34:1

All too often we lump different business models under the rubric of
the "platform," but fail to ask whether they have much in common apart
from using the internet. 42 In its passage from IT phenomenon to social
phenomenon, the definition of the platform seems also to have migrated
from its technical meaning to that of a metaphorical marketplace. 43
Certainly, many new models challenge conventional understandings of
firms and markets but do not embrace the postindustrial corporation's
indifference to productive activity." However, the seductiveness of the
Uber narrative suggests we exercise more caution when trying to
distinguish arrangements that represent innovative ways of organizing
productive activity from those that represent profit-seeking through other'
means, like financial speculation and legal arbitrage.45 Uber's business
identity has been at issue not only in employment law, but also in a
myriad of regulatory disputes involving transportation, antitrust, civil
rights, and consumer protection law.46 Legal questions about business
identity will not go away anytime soon.
Uber drivers differ from industrial manufacturing employees and
from FedEx drivers.47 The question is how do they differ in any way
startups . . rely on two very different types of innovation. There's the technological wizardry that
tums code into a mobile app, and there's the legal maneuvering that turns workers and all the pesky
costs associated with them-minimum wage, overtime, workers' compensation, health care
benefits, and unemployment insurance-into a loose network of independent contractors with little
to no liability for the employer.").
42. See Alex Moazed,
What is a Platform?, APPLICO (May 1, 2016),
https://www.applicoinc.com/blog/what-is-a-platform-business-model/.
43. See, e.g., Reemployment Assistance App. Final Order, Raiser LLC v. Dep't of Econ.
Opportunity, Nos. 0026 2825 90-02, 0026 2834 68-02 at *19 (Dec. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Final
Order] (comparing the Uber application to "a physical location" like "flea markets, art galleries,
street fairs, food truck festivals, and gun shows").
44. See Lauren Drell, 17 Business Models Shaking Up the Marketplace, MASHABLE (June 16,
2014),
http://mashable.com/2014/06/16/unique-business-models/#vDWyuSlncSqh
(showing
different business models that do not follow the traditional firm model or the Uber model); Sonali
K. Shah, Motivation, Governance, and the Viability of Hybrid Forms in Open Source Software

Development, 52 MGT. SCI. 1000, 2000 (2006) (citing examples of "collective innovation").
45. See Annelise Riles, Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 47
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 63, 68-69 (2014).

46. See, e.g., Reardon v. Uber Techs., Inc., 115 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(consumer protection law); Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of Cal. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d.
1073, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (public accommodation law); Meyer v. Kalanick, No. 15 Civ. 9796,
2016 WL 1266801, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016), reconsiderationdenied in part, No. 15 Civ.
9796, 2016 WL 2659591 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2016) (antitrust); Manzo v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13 C
2407, 2014 WL 3495401, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014) (deceptive trade practices); Investigation
to Consider Nature & Extent of Regulation over Operations of Uber Techs., Inc. & Other Similar
Companies, Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No. 86528, 2014 WL 4163861, at *3 (Aug. 6, 2014)
(common carrier regulation).
47.

See Alan Hyde, What Your FedEx and Uber Drivers Have in Common, FORTUNE (June
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that is or should be relevant under the law as we pursue important policy
objectives? This Article begins to address this issue by examining a
more focused one-how the narrative portrays Uber and Lyft drivers as
exceptional by shaping norms of corporate legitimacy. This Article also
highlights the important role that the normative question about the
relationship between the firm and its business form plays in employment
status disputes.
Uber, the fastest growing startup in the world, has "disrupted" the
market 48 for transportation services in Schumpeterian fashion, 49 even
while the company has not yet turned a profit.50

By giving workers

more flexibility in deciding whether, when, and how long to drive for
Uber, it has pushed the horizon of our imagination regarding how we
organize work. 1 Perhaps Uber is the oracle of its own obsolescence,
providing technology that will one day make possible cooperative
production without commodified labor.52
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II introduces the Uber
narrative about technology and transaction costs, primarily through its
appearance in two class actions by Uber and Lyft drivers challenging
Part III summarizes
their independent contractor classification.
the Uber narrative
evaluates
and
markets
and
Coasian theories of firms
54
from this perspective. Part IV discusses the contemporary challenge to
55
the ideals of economic theory that the postindustrial corporation poses.
By investigating the role that Uber and Lyft's business identity played in
the class action disputes, Part IV also shows that a legitimation of the

22, 2015, 2:04 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/06/22/what-your-fedex-and-uber-drivers-have-incommon/.

48. See Alex Marshall, An Old Idea for the New App-Based Economy, GOVERNING (Dec.
2015), http://www.goveming.com/columns/eco-engines/gov-sharing-economy-co-ops.html.
49.

See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 82-84 (Harper

& Row, 3rd ed. 1950) (discussing capitalist "competition . .

which strikes not at the margins of the

profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives").
50. See Eric Newcomer & Ellen Huet, Battling Lyft for Market Share, Uber Again Turns to

Discounting, SKIFT (Jan. 22, 2016, 2:00 PM), https://skift.com/2016/01/22/battling-lyft-for-marketshare-uber-again-turns-to-discounting/.
51. See Bernhard Resch, We Have the Gig Economy All Wrong: Here 's How We Reinvent the

Organization

Man

in

the

Uber-Age,

SALON

(Sept.

8,

http://www.salon.com/2015/09/08/we-have-the-gigeconomy-all-wrong
the_organization man_in.the-uber..age/.

52.

2015,

10:02

AM),

heres.how we-reinvent

See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 48 (suggesting workers could use Uber-like technology to

run cooperatives).

53.

See infra Part I.

54.

See infra Part Il.

55.

See infra PartIV.
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postindustrial corporation gestates within the Uber narrative.
Part V
hypothesizes why the Uber narrative is so ubiquitous, despite
repudiating the very theory it mimics. 57 Part V first looks at the
narrative's appeal to ICTs." It compares Uber and Lyft's account of
their business identities to those of companies that rely less on ICTs to
coordinate service production.59 It then suggests the Uber narrative's
plausibility reflects the more general challenge of theorizing the service
economy.60 Thirdly, Part V suggests that the narrative exploits fault
lines within Coasian theory. Part VI concludes with some implications
of the analysis regarding our understanding of contemporary capitalism
and how we might govern work relations today.62
H1. THE TECHNOLOGY AND TRANSACTION COST NARRATIVE

The "platform economy," shorthand for a growing host of
companies that use advanced digital communications technologies to
coordinate the production and circulation of goods or services, has
inspired a new narrative about technology and the firm. 63 To illustrate,
consider the claims of Uber, the phenomenally successful startup that
provides on-demand ride services through a smartphone application, and
its competitor, Lyft, in two lawsuits regarding whether the companies'
drivers were their "employees" or "independent contractors," as the
companies claimed. 4 For the rare reader who might be unfamiliar with
the Uber application, a brief description follows.65
A. The Uber Application
To use Uber, customers first download the application and enter
their credit card information.66 To request a ride, the customer enters a

56. See infra Part V.
57. See infra Part VI.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See infra Part VI.
63. See Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform 101 MINN. L. REv. 87, 88-89 (2016).
64. See O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
65. Lyft is similar, but this Article notes where it differs. The description applies to the
companies' operations during the periods relevant to the class actions. Uber is a moving target,
however. See infra Part H.A.

66.

See O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1135.
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pick-up location and selects a service tier.67 The application uses GPS
technology to locate a driver in the vicinity and reveals some
information about the driver, including a photo, license number, car
model, and a passenger rating. 68 The application estimates the number
of minutes it will take the driver to arrive and shows the driver's
progress en route to the pick-up location. 69 Following the ride, Uber
charges the passenger's credit card for the fare automatically.70 It pays
the driver based on a portion of the fare every two weeks. 7 1 After each
trip, the application asks the customer to rate the ride.72
Drivers must supply their own vehicle to drive for Uber, although
the company may assist the driver in leasing one.73 Uber does not cover
The company provides drivers who successfully
maintenance.74
complete the hiring process and pass the vehicle inspection with its
software and, if needed, a smartphone. Drivers log into the software to
indicate their present availability to accept ride requests.76 They set their
own schedules, and Uber does not require a minimum number of
hours.
Uber sets the fares and tracks a driver's ride acceptance and
cancellation rates, using these in addition to customer ratings to make
disciplinary and termination decisions.7 8 Uber can terminate drivers at
any time, for any or no reason.
The Lyft service works in a similar manner, although initially the
company did not set fares.80 Also, Lyft limited the number of drivers
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See id.
See id. at 1136.
Final Order, supra note 43.
See O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d. at 1135.
See id. at 1136.
Id. at 1151; see also Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
Compare O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1138, with Eric Newcomer & Olivia Zaleski,

Inside Uber's Auto-Lease Machine, Where Almost Anyone Can Get a Car, BLOOMBERG (May 31,

2016, 11:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-31l/inside-uber-s-auto-leasemachine-where-almost-anyone-can-get-a-car.
74. Ryan B. Frazier, Sharing is Caring:Are Uber, Lyft Drivers Independent Contractors?,21
UTAH EMP'T L. LETTER 1, 2 (2016).
75. Amended Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification at *25, O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826, 2015 WL 5138097 (N.D. Cal.
2015) [hereinafter Amended Order].
76. See O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149.
77. Id.; see also Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1069.
78. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1136, 1143, 1149.
79. Id. at 1149 (noting that Uber's contractual agreement allows "Uber to fire its drivers for
any reason and at any time"); Amended Order, supranote 75, at 22.

80.

See Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1072 (agreement allows Lyft to terminate drivers "at any

time, for any or no reason, without explanation").
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who could log in simultaneously and drivers could request and reserve
hours ahead of time.8
B. O'Connor, Cotter, and the Pervasivenessof the Uber Narrative
In O'Connor v. Uber and Cotter v. Lyft, drivers brought class
actions against the companies in federal court in California, alleging that
they were employees under state and federal wage and hour law, which
therefore entitled them to reimbursement for work expenses, minimum
wage, and tips. 82
The threshold question in determining the drivers' employment
status was, "[d]o the alleged employees provide services for the benefit
of the principal?" 83 An affirmative answer required the alleged
employer to demonstrate that it did not control the manner of service
provision.84
81. Id. at 1071. "Lyft uses projected demand to determine how many drivers could log onto
the app in driver mode at any one time." Id.
82. Amended Order, supra note 75, at 1 (suing for tips and expense reimbursement); Cotter,
60 F. Supp. 3d at 1070 (suing for reimbursement for expenses and minimum wage). Uber has made
it difficult to verify whether driving for Uber can be a decent-paying job. Alison Griswold, In
Search
of
Uber's
Unicorn,
SLATE
(Oct.
27,
2014,
4:29
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2014/10/uber-driverIsalarythe-ride sharing-co
mpany-says its drivers make great.html. Uber has been sued in over two dozen proceedings
implicating its drivers' employment status. See Bologna, supra note 12 (estimating about thirty
class action suits in federal court against Uber); Izvanariu, supra note 9 at n.3 (listing
misclassification lawsuits against Uber and Lyft). The extent to which drivers can hold Uber
accountable for violations of labor and employment law through legal proceedings is uncertain, due
to questions about the enforceability of Uber's arbitration agreements. See Katherine V. W. Stone,
Uber and Arbitration: A Lethal Combination, ECON. POL'Y INST. (May 24, 2016, 11:33 AM),
http://www.epi.org/blog/uber-and-arbitration-a-lethal-combination/.

The agreements mandate that

drivers pursue claims through arbitration, and prohibit class, collective, and representative actions.
Id. The agreements thereby preclude the most realistic legal means of holding Uber responsible on
a wide scale. Id. If courts uphold the agreements and new drivers and drivers renewing their
agreements do not opt out of them, it will be difficult for drivers effectively to vindicate their rights.
Id. Recently, the Ninth Circuit overturned most of a district court ruling that the arbitration
agreements were unenforceable, agreeing with the district court only that the waiver of California

Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") claims in one agreement was against public policy.
Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., Nos. 15-16178, 15-16181, 15-16250, 2016 WL 4651409, at *3, *7
(9th Cir. 2016). Moreover, the circuit courts are divided as to whether agreements prohibiting class
and collective dispute resolution violate the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), which
recognizes the right of employees to engage in "concerted activities." Lawrence E. Dub6, NLRB,
Employers Urge Justices to Rule on Class Waivers, BNA DAILY LAB. REP. (Sept. 13, 2016),
http://www.bna.com/nlrb-employers-urge-n57982076885/.
The split makes it likely that the
Supreme Court will review the issue. See id.
83. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1135.
84. Id. at 1138; Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1073; see also Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895,
900 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Uber and Lyft contended that the drivers performed no services for
them.85 The companies argued that they were in a different line of
business than the drivers: Lyft is a technology company that operates a
mobile application-based platform that facilitates transactions between
third parties offering rides and individuals seeking rides.86 "By contrast,
[the plaintiffs] were drivers, an entirely different business and
occupation."" Uber argued it was a "technology company" that "does
88
not provide transportation services to passengers." In particular, "Uber
has developed a technology platform-the Uber App-that people
seeking transportation can use to connect with transportation
providers." 89 "The work Plaintiffs performed-driving passengers-is
distinct from Defendant's principal business of developing mobile lead
90
generation and payment processing software."
Rather than the provide Uber and Lyft with services, it was the
other way around: Uber claimed, "Plaintiffs pay Defendant for access to
85. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1141 (noting "Uber passes itself off as merely a
technological intermediary between potential riders and potential drivers"); Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d
at 1078; see also Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 11-46739EK at 8 (Cal. Lab. Comm., June 3,
2015) (rejecting Uber's claim that it did not provide transportation services); Search v. Uber Techs.,
Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 222, 232 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting Uber claimed it was not a "car service"). In a
civil rights case, the National Federation of the Blind sued Uber under the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), alleging drivers refused to allow service animals in the cars. Uber argued
it was not subject to the ADA because it was a technology company, not a "public accommodation."

Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of Cal. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1076, 1080 (N.D. Cal.
2015).
86. Defendant Lyft, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d
1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 13-cv-04065-VC) [hereinafter Summary Judgment Motion]. "Lyft's
business is to maintain an on-line platform, making it possible for riders and drivers to freely
arrange transportation by automobile with other members of the community." Id. at 1.
87. Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 86, at 3, 22 (noting the drivers' agreement

declares "LYFT DOES NOT PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, AND LYFT IS NOT A
TRANSPORTATION CARRIER"); Notice of Motion and Motion of the Defendant Uber
Technologies, Inc. for Summary Judgment: Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
Thereof, O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d. 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 13-03826EMC) [hereinafter Notice ofMotion].
88.

Notice of Motion, supra note 87, at 26.

89. Reply of Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. in Support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment at 1, O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d. 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. CV 1303826-EMC) [hereinafter Reply]; see also Defendants' Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint and/or for a More Definite Statement; Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support Thereof at 2, Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind Cal. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 103 F.
Supp. 3d. 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 3:14-cv-04086-NC) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss] ("Uber
provides the technology that allows passengers and transportation providers to make a 'match'

based on their location and passengers' vehicle preference"); Berwick, No. 11-46739 at 3 (noting
Uber claimed it was a "technological platform, a smart phone application that private vehicle drivers
('Transportation Providers') and passengers use to facilitate private transactions").
90.

Notice of Motion, supra note 87, at 26.
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leads via the Uber App and to benefit from Defendant's marketing
efforts and payment processing. 91 Like passengers, Plaintiffs and other
drivers are customers who receive a service from Defendant." 92
Furthermore, Uber stated, "[w]hat we've done is we've implemented an
application that riders and drivers find attractive to utilize their vehicles
where they would otherwise be unutilized. It's a benefit to them; it's a
service to them." 93 "The fact that we benefit from these individuals
using our apps simply makes them a customer." 94 In Lyft's rhetoric,
drivers and passengers were interchangeable members of a "ride-sharing
community."9 Uber was so bold as to claim:
.This Court's inquiry into Plaintiffs' employment status
may end here, because the undisputed facts show that
Plaintiffs did not perform any services for Defendant.
To the contrary, Defendant, by providing leads,
connecting drivers to passengers, and seamlessly
processing payment of fares, provides a service to
drivers and receives a fee for that service in return. 96
To sum, the narrative of Uber and Lyft's business identity (the
"Uber narrative" or the "Narrative") is as follows: We do not provide
transportation services. We are a technology company.97 We use
91. Id. at 1.
92. Id. at 1, 17 (Drivers contract with Uber to "gain access" to a "lead generation platform");
Transcript of Proceedings at 17, O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d. 1133 (N.D. Cal
2015) (No. C 13-3826 EMC) [hereinafter Transcript] ("But, fundamentally, the commercial
relationship between these drivers and transportation providers and Uber is one where they are our
customer, where we license to them our software, and we receive a fee for doing that."); Reply,
supra note 89, at 3 ("Plaintiffs are Uber's customers, paying Uber a fee for each successful referral,
and it is simply unremarkable that a paying customer is important to a business.").
93.

Transcript, supra note 92, at 73.

94. Id. at 16. .Some companies do not receive most of their revenue from sales of the product
or service it markets to the public. Newspapers earn revenue from advertisers. Uber, by contrast,
depends on passenger fares. O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d. 1133, 1142 (N.D. Cal.
2015). A court found that exotic dancers/strippers were "an integral part" of the business of an
upscale strip club, even though much of the club's revenues were from alcohol sales. Sandoval v.
M.J.F. Bowery Corp., No. ESCV200901835C, 2011 WL 5517331, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2011).
95. Drivers' written agreements did not construe them as employees but rather more like
customers. Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 86, at 2-3. Lyft drivers signed a user license for
"accessing the platform." Id. at 1-2. An Uber agreement provided: "In exchange
for your access to
and use of the Software and Service, including the right to receive the Requests, you agree to pay to
the Company a fee for each Request accepted. . . ." E.g., Final Order, supra note 43.
96. Notice of Motion, supra note 87, at 18. See also id. at 1 (arguing the court's inquiry
should end with the determination that Defendant provided Plaintiffs with a service).
97. Id. at 26.
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technology to facilitate a market between independent sellers and
In particular, we use advanced information and
buyers. 98
communication technologies to lower the costs of market exchange, like
payment processing and search costs, which might otherwise impede
99
independent sellers and buyers from realizing a "match."
The Narrative is not confined to the companies' strategic and
100 It has become
situated legal characterizations of their business model.
a rather ubiquitous characterization of the platform economy in the
10
media and academy that almost always casts Uber as its archetype.o A
recent law review article recounts, "[s]haring platforms thus facilitate
exchanges that might otherwise never occur due to high transaction
costs."

02

"These markets allow informal participants to operate at a

10 3
Another academic
small scale by minimizing transaction costs"
it. was just too
but
existed,
always
have
matches
remarks, "[t]hose
the costs
platform,
expensive to find them... . But by having a digital
get much lower so you get more of those matches."'" A blog, also
discussing Uber as an example, says, "[1]ower transaction .costs are what
drive the evolution of the market from traditional firms to large
networks." 05 Another commentator, referring to Uber as a paradigmatic
example, exclaims:

The existence of high transaction costs outside firms led
to the emergence of the firm as we know it, and
management as we still have it.

..

. [The reverse side of

Coase's argument is as important:] If the (transaction)
98.

Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 86, at 1.

99. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 89, at 2; cf Salovitz v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. A-14-CV823, 2014 WL 5318031, at *1 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (quoting Uber's argument that it "merely provides
a platform for people who own vehicles to leverage their skills and personal assets and connect with
other people looking to pay for those skills and assets").
100. See Sunny Freeman, 'Uberization' of Everything Is Happening, But Not Every 'Uber'
AM),
8:28
2015,
1,
(Apr.
POST
HUFFINTON
Succeed,
Will
2
2
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/ 015/04/01/uberization-uber-of-everythingLn697175 .html.
101. Id.; Kilpi, supra note 6 ("The Internet, together with technological intelligence, makes it
possible to create totally new forms of economic entities, such as the 'Uber for everything' type of
platforms/service markets that we see emerging today.").
102. Vanessa Katz, Regulating the Sharing Economy, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1067, 1075-76
(2015).
103. Id. at 1107; see also Lobel, supra note 63, at 17 (taking a "Coasean transaction cost
perspective"); Roberta A. Kaplan, Regulation and the Sharing Economy, N.Y. L.J. (2014)
("Dharing apps and websites act like 'virtual matchmakers' by facilitating relationships that
otherwise might be too costly or burdensome to arrange.").
104.

Bruner, supra note 1.

105. O'Reilly, supra note 39.
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costs of exchanging value in the society at large go
down drastically as is happening today, the form and
logic of economic [and organizational] entities
necessarily need to change! 106
C. TransactionCosts Economics and PoliticalAppeal
The Uber narrative speaks in the language of transaction costs
economics ("TCE"), from whence it derives a certain political appeal. 107
The narrative would seem to resolve an old debate between free market
advocates and those in favor of more centralized planning to satisfaction
of the former. 08 Free market adherents extolled the "marvel" of the
market as the. most efficient way of organizing economic activity.1 09
The fact that most of the economy was organized instead through large
command-and-control organizations posed a conundrum.110
The
economist Ronald Coase, regarded as the forbear of firm theory and
TCE, was interlocutor to this debate."' His seminal 1937 article, The
Nature of the Firm, sought to explain why firms existed, or why some
productive activities were carried out in markets and others through
centralized coordination.112 Coase rejected the popular answer that firms
were an aberration created by foul play, like the predatory practices of
robber barons.113 He argued that there were also costs to market
transactions, like the time and resources it took to find information and
negotiate contracts. 1 14 Sometimes these would exceed the costs of

106. Kilpi, supra note 6.
107. See Coase, supra note 3, at 4.
108. See id. at 8 (noting that around 1930, "economists in the West were engaged in a grand
debate on the subject of planning," spurred in part by questions about how Russia would organize
its economy).
109. See F. A. Hayek, The Use ofKnowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv. 519, 527 (1945).
110. See Coase, supranote 3, at 7-8. In response to the claim that "competition would provide
all the coordination needed," Coase mused, "[y]et we had in economics a factor of production,
management, whose function was to coordinate." Id. at 7. He also noted the difficulty of
reconciling claims that it would be impossible to organize Russia as "one big factory" with the
existence of factories in England and the U.S. See id.; see also Oliver E. Williamson, Outsourcing:
Transaction Cost Economics and Supply Chain Management, 44 J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT., 5, 8
(2008) [hereinafter Williamson, Outsourcing] (referring to the intellectual contest between the
"marvel of the market" and the "marvel of hierarchy").
111. See Coase, supra note 3, at 8.
112. See Coase, Nature, supranote 4, at 390-92.
113. See id. at 400-01.
114. See id. at 390-91; see also R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcON. 1, 15
(1960).
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organizing economic activity through centralized direction." In such
cases, the firm would emerge as the more efficient organizational
form.' 16

The Uber narrative suggests that ICTs have made the firm obsolete
by lowering transaction costs in the market.1 17 "The [i]nternet is nothing
18 ICTs
less than an extinction-level event for the traditional firm."'
enable individuals to realize their interests in economic exchange
without integrating into a firm." 9 We can finally retire the firm as a
means of coordinating economic activity, because "[w]e stand on the
threshold of an economy where the familiar economic entities are
becoming increasingly irrelevant." 1 20
What happens when we actually subject the Uber narrative to
scrutiny under Coasian theory? It does not hold up. From the Coasian
perspective, Uber does not write the epitaph of the firm.
III.

UBER AND CLASSIC THEORIES OF FIRMS AND MARKETS

A. The CentralizedMarket
Coase theorized "firms" and "markets" as alternative ways of
coordinating resources in production.121 He defined the firm as the
coordination of resources by the command of the "entrepreneur-coof resources
ordinator." 1 2 2 He defined the market as the coordination
23
exchange.1
voluntary
and
mechanism
price
through the

115.
116.

See Coase, Nature, supra note 4, at 391.
See id. at 392; R. H. Coase, IndustrialOrganization:A Proposalfor Research, in POLICY

ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 63-64 (Victor R. Fuchs

ed., Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, 1972).
117. A somewhat different "Coasian" narrative focuses on relationships between Uber and its
drivers rather than drivers and passengers: "Thus, the Coasian explanation for the growth of online
intermediaries is that new computer and information technology enables a more efficient means for
companies to contract with third parties (i.e., technology lowers the transaction costs that induce
companies to hire employees rather than to contract work out)." Seth D. Harris and Alan B.
Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: The
2015),
Paper No. 2015-10,
"Independent Worker " 26 (Brookings, Discussion
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modemizing_1abor_1awsfor-twenty-firstcentury-wor
k-krueger._harris.pdf. This literally begs the question: Is Uber contracting with the drivers as
employees or contracting with them on the market?
118. Kilpi, supra note 6.
119. See Harris & Krueger, supra note 117.
120. Id.
121. Coase, Nature, supra note 4, at 388.
122. Id. at 388, 392.
123. Id. at 388-89.
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Following Coase, others also conceptualized firms and markets as
alternative means of allocating and directing resources. 124 They
theorized the firm as an organization that replaced the market's
coordinating features of price signals, competition, and voluntary
exchange with more conscious and centralized direction. 125 Alfred
Chandler, in his prodigious history of the rise of the large, vertically
integrated enterprise in the United States argued: "What the new
enterprises did [] was take over from the market the coordination and
integration of the flow of goods and services from the production of the
raw materials through the several processes of production to the sale to
the ultimate consumer." 1 2 6 In the firm, "[tihe visible hand of
management replaced the invisible hand of market forces." 127 Oliver
Williamson, the economist most associated with TCE, defined firms and
markets as different governance structures for coordinating productive
activity, agreeing with Coase that what distinguished the firm was its
centralized direction. 12 8 Oliver Hart conceptualized firms and markets
as alternative sets of social relations for coordinating value-enhancing
activity, associating the firm with residual control over productive
assets.129
Steven Cheung denoted firm coordination in terms of
"observations of direction by price signal versus direction by an
entrepreneur," or the direction of economic activity "by a visible hand,
not by the invisible hand of a price mechanism." 13 0 Even Kenneth
Arrow, an economist associated with the neoclassical tradition, against
which Coasian theorists tended to distinguish themselves, associated the
firm with the "replacement of the costs of buying and selling on the
market by the costs of intrafirm transfers."1 3 1
124. Id. at 388; see, e.g., ALFRED CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1997); Oliver Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics:

The Governance of ContractualRelations, 22 J. L. & EcoN. 233, 234-35, 252 (1979) [hereinafter
Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics].

125. See CHANDLER, supra note 124, at 10-11; see also Williamson, Transaction-Cost
Economics, supra note 124, at 252.
126. CHANDLER, supra note 124, at 11.

127. Id. at 12.
128. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach,
87 AM. J. OF Soc. 548, 570 (1981) [hereinafter Williamson, Economics]; Williamson, TransactionCost Economics, supra note 124, at 239.
129. See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 33 (Clarendon Press,

Oxford Univ. Press 1995); Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1765 (1989).
130. Steven N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1, 10, 18
(1983).
131. The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB System, No. 27-877,
Subcomm. on Econ. in Gov't, 91st Cong. 48 (1969) (statement of Kenneth J. Arrow, professor of
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Classic theories of the firm conceptualized the firm as a productive
enterprise.1 32 The central problem of firm theory became the "make or
buy" question: What determines whether an entrepreneur will make an
33
Scholars developed
input to production or buy it on the market?
would emerge
firms
which
under
conditions
the
about
different theories
Chandler, for
markets.134
than
to coordinate resources more efficiently
example, argued that administrative coordination became cheaper than
market coordination when technology, economies of scale, expanding
markets, and organizational innovation improved the speed of
35
production and distribution ("throughput").1
As noted above, Coase and TCE argued that firms existed because
the price of organizing economic activity through markets was not
zero.1 3 6 Sometimes it was cheaper to incur the costs of centralized
direction, like those of directing and monitoring exchange partners, than
those of market coordination, like discovering prices, finding other
37
Oliver Williamson, perhaps
information, and negotiating agreements.
by theorizing that firm
Coase
upon
elaborated
scholar,
TCE
foremost
the
challenges
contracting
resolve
to
boundaries should best reflect how
a
likely to arise from certain dimensions of the "transaction," step in the
productive process.1 3 8 Two principal challenges were opportunism and
cognitive limitations in the ability to plan and account for contingencies
ahead of time.1 3 9
economics at Harvard University, Efficiency of Decisionmaking in Economic Systems); see also
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Firm as a DedicatedHierarchy:A Theory of the Origin
and Growth of Firms 37-39 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7546, 2000),
4
http://www.nber.org/papers/w75 6 (using the Coasian definition of the firm).
132. See Rajan & Zingales, supra note 131, at 39.
133. Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory, in THE
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 77, 80 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., Princeton
Univ. Press 1994) [hereinafter Williamson, Organization Theory]; Williamson, Outsourcing, supra
note 110, at 8 ("The upshot is that each make-or-buy decision reduces to ascertaining whether the
transaction should be mediated by an interfirm or by an intrafirm contract, where the first
corresponds to the market (buy) and the latter to hierarchy (make)."). "[T]he make-or-buy decision
is the paradigm transaction." Id. at 14.
134. See Rajan & Zingales, supranote 131, at 39.
135. CHANDLER, supra note 124. This somewhat echoes Weber's theory of the commercial
bureaucracy, an enterprise that "combin[ed] many complementary processes under continuous
common supervision" in production.

MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF

INTERPRETATIVE SOCIOLOGY 137 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
136. Williamson, Outsourcing, supra note 110, at 6.
137. Coase, Nature, supra note 4, at 389-91; see also Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of
Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 147-48 (1979) (categorizing Coasian transaction costs as "search
and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and enforcement costs").
138. See Williamson, Economics, supranote 128, at 552-53.
139. Williamson, Organization Theory, supra note 133, at 77, 81. Williamson suggested that
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Coasian theorists suggested that firm production was sometimes
superior to market production, or entailed lower transaction costs,
because it coordinated production using a different division of labor than
the market. 140 In the firm division of labor, some persons designed and
monitored the work and others carried it out.141 It entailed the separation
of conception and management from execution. 142
Economists Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz conceive of firm
production in this way. 14 3 They suggested that make or buy decisions
would depend on how best to realize the advantages of cooperative
production.144 Transactions sometimes required coordination beyond
what the market was capable of organizing. 145 It was difficult to
organize ongoing, multilateral cooperation through contractual relations,
because contracts were designed for instances of relatively discrete and
bilateral cooperation.146 However, complex production posed its own
challenges: How do you monitor contributors to prevent shirking? How
do you measure individual contributions to output? If the production is
so complex that you do not know exactly how much of each input will
be necessary, how do you plan ahead for compensating those who
contribute? Alchian's and Demsetz's solution was their conception of
the firm: A central coordinator would monitor the inputs and assess their
productivity.1 4 7 Most input providers would contribute only their work
effort. 148
Williamson's hypotheses about "human assets" also depict firm

the firm might be the more efficient governance structure for idiosyncratic transactions that were

difficult to fully plan ahead of time. Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics, supra note 124, at
241-42. Cognitive limitations, as well as the legal requirement that contracts specify the details
parties might want to enforce, would make negotiations expensive and likely ineffective. Id. The
parties would likely be unable to specify relevant contingencies, leaving one or both vulnerable to
opportunistic behavior. Id. Further, idiosyncratic transactions-transactions that other actors do not
customarily undertake-are prone to the "hold-up" problem if organized through the market. Id.

Idiosyncratic transactions often require parties to make investments that cannot easily be redeployed
to other uses or reliably priced in markets. Id. The parties' interdependency increases the risk of
opportunism. Williamson, Economics, supranote 128, at 553.
140. Rajan & Zingales, supranote 131, at 40.
141. See WEBER, supra note 135, at 136-137 (discussing the bureaucratic organization); see
e.g., CHANDLER, supra note 124, at 136-37 (discussing Coase).
142. Id.
143.

Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic

Organization,62 Am. ECON. REv. 777, 777 (1972).
144. Id. at 778.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 777.
147. See id. at 794.
148. See id. at 782-83.
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governance as managing a division of labor involving the separation of
conception from execution. 149 He suggests that firm production was
more likely when the transaction involved low human asset
"Low" specificity meant the individual worker
specificity. 50
contributed primarily labor effort and not specialized skills or expertise
that could be re-deployed to other uses, which would create less bilateral
dependence.' 5 ' Firm governance was also more likely when it was
relatively easy to measure and assess the individual's contribution,
which tended to coincide with low human asset specificity.1 52
The separation of conception from execution and management
reflects the tenets of Taylorism and Fordism.15 3 Frederick Taylor's
theory of scientific management prescribed that enterprises should break
down skilled work into unskilled work and remove discretion and
improvisation.1 54 This was supposed to facilitate greater control over
production by making it easier to command, monitor, and pace the work,
and to assess individual effort.' 5 5 Under Fordism, technology would
remove the functions of conceptualization and management from
workers by embodying these in the machine. 56
B. Uber Does Not Redefine the Firm
Coasian theory is vulnerable to many criticisms, ranging from
whether it can claim to be a theory at all, 157 to its ability to answer its
149. See generally Williamson, Outsourcing, supra note 110.
150. See Williamson, Economics, supra note 128, at 563.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 563; see also CHANDLER, supra note 124, at 281, 412-13 (He theorized that the
efficiency advantages of the large enterprise derived primarily from the ability to coordinate and
integrate the flow of materials through production; however, he also emphasized the importance of
subdividing the work and creating managerial specialties to direct it. Along with improved
technology, the development of managerial hierarchies improved the ability to coordinate labor and

&

materials faster and in greater volumes than markets.).
153. See CHANDLER, supranote 124, at 275-76.
154. See THE WRITINGS OF THE GILBRETHS 104, 108, 115-116, 121 (William R. Spriegel

Clark E. Myers eds., 1953); see also CHANDLER, supra note 124, at 276-77.
155. See CHANDLER, supra note 124, at 276-77 (suggesting that this division of labor became a
signature feature of the productive enterprise and distinguished it from the guild of independent

artisans).
156. KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR
THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 45 (2004). The appropriation by large enterprises of the work of

markets in the U.S. was also a dual appropriation of another kind-the appropriation of property
from skilled artisans and its concentration into the entrepreneur and eventually large stockholders,

and the appropriation of knowledge and skill from artisanal work and its transfer into machines and
engineers, all under the direction of a managerial hierarchy. See id. at 13-50.
157. Coasian theories often relinquish some, but not all, of the assumptions of neoclassical
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central question-why some productive activities are coordinated
through more centralized governance structures and others through more
decentralized ones '-to whether it can account for the empirical matrix
of governance structures and its difficulty in theorizing the institutional
components of different governance structures." 9
economic theory that plagued its explanatory capacity, amenability to testing, and its claims to
being part of social science as opposed to normative theory or a rationalization of the status quo.
Some versions of Coasian theory are a species of "efficiency" theory, which assumes that
competition selects the most efficient institutional forms of economic activity, because individuals
are self-interested, rational (within bounds) maximizers with exogenous preferences.
See
Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics, supra note 124, at 241-42; Charles Perrow, Economic
Theories ofOrganization, 15 TIEORY & Soc'Y 11, 16, 19 (1986) (describing TCE as "an efficiency
argument for the present state of affairs"); Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social
Structure: The Problem ofEmbeddedness, 91 AM. J. Soc. 481 (1985) (setting out some explanatory
limits of efficiency hypotheses). Many processes shape preferences, organizational forms, and what
is perceived as "efficient," including historically specific and contingent power struggles; state
activity; cognitive frameworks, imitation, network diffusion, and other mechanisms of
organizational isomorphism; and professionalization. E.g., NEL FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF CORPORATE CONTROL (Harvard Univ. Press 1990); WILLIAM G. Roy, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL:
THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN AMERICA 259-265 (Princeton Univ. Press

1990) (1997); Donald MacKenzie & Yuval Millo, Constructinga Market, Performing Theory: The
HistoricalSociology of a FinancialDerivatives Exchange, 109 AM. J. Soc. 107 (2003); John W.
Meyer & Brian Rowan, InstitutionalizedOrganizations:Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,

83 AM. J. Soc. 340 (1977); Mark S. Mizruchi et al., The Conditional Nature of Embeddedness: A
Study of Borrowing by Large US Firms, 1973-1994, 71 AM. Soc. REv. 310 (2006); Mark J. Roe,
PoliticalPreconditionsto Separating Ownership from CorporateControl, 53 STAN. L. REv. 539,
561-61 (2000).
158. Some scholarship problematizes the value of treating the transaction as an exogenous
variable in trying to account for the governance structures of economic activity. E.g., HART, supra
note 129, at 33 (theorizing asset specificity as endogenous); trica Gorga & Michael Halberstam,
Knowledge Resources and Their Implications for the Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance
38
(Mar.
21,
2006)
(unpublished
draft
manuscript),
https://law.utexas.edu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/25/gorga-knowledge resources.pdf (noting that TCE tends to treat knowledge
as exogenous). Williamson has himself questioned whether the transaction is the best unit of
analysis for understanding supply chains. See, e.g., Williamson, Outsourcing,supra note 110, at 14.
Others have maintained that TCE ignores certain transaction costs, and consequential dimensions of
the transaction. E.g., Perrow, supranote 157, at 30.
159. A common critique of Coasian theories, and TCE in particular, is that the taxonomy of
firms and markets, even when it allowed for hybrid, firm-like and market-like structures, could not
account for the vast empirical variety of ways to organize productive activity. See Paul DiMaggio,
Introduction:Making Sense ofthe ContemporaryFirm and PrefiguringIts Future, in THE TWENTYFIRST-CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3,

17-19 (Paul DiMaggio ed., Princeton Univ. Press 2001) [hereinafter DiMaggio, Introduction]
(discussing organizational forms that challenge Chandler and Williamson's theories of firms and
markets); Perrow, supra note 157, at 39 (reviewing scholarship finding that "some markets are quite
hierarchically organized, and that some hierarchies have many phenomena associated with
markets"). Scholars have critiqued Coasian theories for failing to account for governance structures
that appropriated the market mechanisms of price and competition and yet were relatively nonhierarchical. See, e.g., Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 158, at 47 (describing many Silicon Valley
companies as engaging in centralized, non-market coordination without hierarchy); see also Paul S.
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Here, however, we are not interested in the explanatory value of.
Coasian theory and TCE, but rather, accepting it on its own terms, in
what it reveals about the Uber narrative. As noted, Coase and major
theorists who followed him conceptualized firms and markets as
alternative ways of coordinating and allocating resources to their most
valued uses. 160 Firms and markets did the same thing, but through
different means. What defines the Coasian firm and distinguishes it
from a market is the coordination of resources through centralized
direction rather than decentralized competition, voluntary exchange, and
price.161 The firm is an "unfree" market, a decentralized firm, and the
firm is a centrally coordinated market.
If we take Coasian theory seriously, then, Uber does not redefine
the firm or write its epitaph. The technology-and-transaction-cost
narrative becomes illegible as a description of Uber and Lyft. From a
Coasian perspective, the companies look much more like firms engaged
in the production and sale of ride services than facilitators of a market
for ride sellers and buyers.
Uber replaces the "spontaneous" "autonomous adjustments" of
supply and demand from price signals with the "consciously coordinated
adaptations" of centralized production. 16 2 Consider Lyft's description of
its operations in the class action. Lyft explains that after someone
requests a ride through the smartphone application:
The platform then notifies one specific driver, who may
choose to accept, decline, or ignore the ride request. If
the driver accepts the ride, he or she is "matched" with
the rider and may proceed to pick up the rider and
provide the ride.

. .

. If the driver declines or ignores the

Adler & Charles Heckscher, Towards Collaborative Community, in THE FIRM AS COLLABORATIVE
CoMMUNITY: RECONSTRUCTING TRUST IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 11, 11, 20 (Charles

Heckscher & Paul S. Adler eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2006). More generally, scholars have drawn
attention to Coasian theory's unclear and/or unsatisfying theorization of the institutional means of
firm and market coordination, for instance, the role of legal relations, control, technology,
knowledge, reputation, cultural norms, and business structure. See, e.g., Rajan & Zingales, supra
note 131, at 37-39; see infra Part IV (returning to this issue to suggest that Coasian theory made

itself vulnerable to appropriation by the Uber narrative).
160.

E.g., Coase, Nature, supra note 4, at 388 ("It is clear that these are alternative methods of

co-ordinating production."); Williamson, Outsourcing, supra note 110, at 14 ("TCE views
governance as the means by which to infuse order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize mutual
gains.").
161.

See Coase, Nature, supra note 4, at 388.

162. Williamson, Outsourcing, supra note 110, at 7; see also Alchian & Demsetz, supra note
143, at 777.
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ride request and a certain amount of time passes, the
ride request is then transmitted to another driver, if one
is available . .. and so on."'

63

The first contention that the driver "may choose to accept, decline,
or ignore the ride request," is only partially correct.'6 As noted, the
drivers' positions are at-will: the companies have the right to terminate
drivers for any or no reason.1 6 5 Lyft and Uber track drivers' acceptance
rates and use these to make disciplinary and termination decisions.1 6 6
Right away, we see that the market process of voluntary exchangeparticipant's freedom to deal or not deal with one another based on an
evaluation of possible gain or other utility preferences-is missing.1 6 7
Uber and Lyft have appropriated this adaptive mechanism. 68
Continuing with the quote above, Lyft goes on to tell the court it
has replaced market processes with centralized coordination-Lyft does
the matching.1 69 The smartphone application selects "one specific
driver" and directs that driver to a passenger.' 7 The passenger cannot
choose among drivers, and the application reveals only one ride request
to a driver at a time. 171 Uber does not disclose the passenger's
destination until after the driver has accepted the request, and penalizes
163.

Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 86, at 4; see also Notice ofMotion, supra note 87,

at 4 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) ("When a passenger requests transportation via the Uber
App, Defendant conveys the request to the nearest driver who is signed in to the Uber App and not
already providing transportation booked via the application. If the driver declines the request or
does not accept it within 15 seconds, the request is forwarded to the next closest driver.").
164. Summary JudgmentMotion, supranote 86, at 4.

165. See O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1149 n.19 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see
also Cotter V. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
166. Drivers have limited discretion to decline ride assignments when they are logged into the
application. While Uber and Lyft have claimed that a driver is not required to accept any particular
pick-up request, they track acceptance and cancellation rates and use them to make termination
decisions. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149, 1151; Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1071. Uber might ask
drivers to maintain a certain acceptance rate, but even if a driver meets it, Uber may decide later that
the rate is too low and terminate the driver. Uber terminated or suspended a large group of drivers
in the San Francisco Bay Area and Los Angeles without warning due to what it regarded as high
cancellation rates. Christian Perea, Uber Deactivateda Bunch of Drivers as an Intimidation Tactic,

THE RIDESHARE GuY (Sept. 24, 2015), http://therideshareguy.com/uber-deactivated-a-bunch-ofdrivers-as-an-intimidation-tactic/. Many drivers had realized that they could not earn money on
short trips due to traffic and had been cancelling short trip requests. See id. Drivers are subject to
discipline, as well, including warnings, training courses, and pay penalties. See O'Connor, 82 F.
Supp. 3d at 1137, 1150-51; Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1079.
167. See Coase, Nature, supranote 4, at 389-90.
168. See id.
169.

Summary JudgmentMotion, supranote 86, at 3.

170. Id. at 4.
171. See id.
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drivers for cancellations at its discretion. 17 2 Lyft has also allowed
passengers to wait to disclose their destination. 173 Uber has also limited
drivers' discretion to choose where they want to drive. 174
By design then, the application prevents drivers from competing
with one another for passengers, as they would if they were sellers in a
market for transportation services.175 Instead, drivers compete with one
another to keep their positions with Uber and Lyft.176 The driver picks
up the passenger to keep a job with Uber, not in response to price signals
and other information that indicates the transaction will be a good
bargain.177 The applications deter drivers from evaluating the latter.17 1
The applications likewise prevent drivers from competing over
price.19 Uber and Lyft set passenger fares-they appropriate the price
mechanism.1s According to Coase, "[i]t can, I think, be assumed that
the distinguishing mark of the firm is the supersession of the price

172.

O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1150-51 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Uber

evaluates drivers' performance based on customer feedback, as well as acceptance and cancellation
rates. Id.; see also Alex Rosenblat & Luke Stark, Uber's Drivers: Information Asymmetries and

&

Control in Dynamic Work 4 (Oct. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Data
Soc'y Research Inst.), http://papers.ssm.com/abstract-2686227.
173. Recently, however, Uber announced it would introduce an application feature in some
cities to enable drivers to avoid being matched with passengers going in a different direction. Eric
Newcomer, Uber Makes Changes to Appease Drivers Without Raising Fares, BLOOMBERtG (June 6,

2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-06/uber-makes-changes-toappease-drivers-without-raising-fares.
174. See Benjamin Sachs, Do We Need an "Independent Worker" Category?, ONLABOR (Dec.
8, 2015), http://onlabor.org/2015/12/08/do-we-need-an-independent-worker-category/ (noting Uber
has terminated drivers for limiting where they drive; i.e., sticking to just one neighborhood, or only

taking airport rides).
175. See O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1141.
176. Id. at 1143, 1150. Uber and Lyft compare drivers' performances and terminate drivers
with relatively low passenger ratings or other performance metrics. Id. (discussing Uber's
termination of drivers with relatively low ratings and when business was "slower than normal");

Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1071, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Rosenblat & Stark, supra
note 172, at 11 (noting Uber sends drivers weekly feedback comparing their performance to that of

"top drivers").
177.

See Coase, Nature, supra note 4, at 387 ("If a workman moves from department Y to

department X, he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he is ordered to do
so.").
178. See id.
179. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1142 ([T]he "fare amount [] is set by Uber without any input
from the drivers.").

180. Uber sets fares unilaterally. It prohibits drivers from negotiating for higher fares and the
application prevents passengers from paying lower fares. See O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1142,
1144; Meyer v. Kalanick, No. 15 Civ. 9796, 2016 WL 1266801, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016),
reconsiderationdenied in part, No. 15 Civ. 9796, 2016 WL 2659591 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2016). Lyft
initially gave passengers 24 hours following a ride to submit a voluntary donation before
automatically charging the passengers' credit card the fare. Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1070.
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The many work rules Uber and Lyft impose on drivers to create the
standardized services from which the companies derive their brand
recognition also suggests their role as sellers ("makers") of ride services,
not market mediators. 182 Uber, for example, tells drivers to follow
detailed rules to create a uniform ride experience.1 83 The rules, billed as
"suggestions," cover matters including clothing, music, how to pick up
passengers, and what they can and cannot say. 18 4 Uber and Lyft, not the
competitive currents of the market, "match" not only riders with drivers,
but drivers' labor with their cars to create a branded service.' 8 5
Compare Uber and Lyft to some other platform companies that
provide goods and services. 86
Some, including Airbnb
(accommodation), Etsy (goods), Upwork (remote services), TaskRabbit
(small task services), and Amazon's Mechanical Turk (computing
services), do not set customer prices. 87
The price mechanism
coordinates buyers and sellers to a greater extent on some other
platforms.'8 8 Airbnb, Ebay, and Amazon, for example, provide potential
buyers with information about all sellers that match their expressed
preferences, and customers can search for and select from sellers whom
they wish to purchase accommodations, services, and products.1 89 Some
181. Coase, Nature, supra note 4, at 389.
182. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3dat 1143, 1150-51; Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1071.
183. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149-51; Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1072-73, 1078.
184. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149-51 (listing examples of driver rules, including to "make
sure the radio is off or on soft jazz or NPR"; and "make sure to open the door for your client").
Uber drivers could not solicit passengers, give out business cards, inform passengers about other
transportation options, or display insignia for other transportation companies. Id. at 1142.
Passengers could not request certain drivers. Id.; Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1072 (listing examples of
driver rules, including, "greet every passenger with a big smile and fist bump"). Lyft also
prohibited drivers from soliciting passengers. Id.
185. See Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 172, at 8-9.
186. See, e.g., About Upwork, UpwORK, https://www.upwork.com/i/how-it-works/faq/ (last
visited Dec. 25, 2016) (connecting freelancers to business); AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK,
https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome (last visited Dec. 25, 2016) (an online marketplace
computing service); Heather Somerville, TaskRabbit Reboots with New Business Model,
SILICONBEAT (June 17, 2014, 11:28 AM), http://www.siliconbeat.com/2014/06/17/taskrabbitreboots-with-new-business-model/ (TaskRabbit: a company whose business is to outsource small
jobs to nearby people).
187. See About Etsy, ETsY, https://www.etsy.com/about/ (last visited Dec. 25, 2016); About
Upwork supra note 186; About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us (last visited
Dec. 25, 2016); AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, supranote 186; Somerville, supra note 186.
188. See, e.g., About Etsy, supra note 187; About Upwork, supra note 186; About Us, supra
note 187; AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, supranote 186; Somerville, supra note 186.

189. See Noam Scheiber, Uber Drivers and Others in the Gig Economy Take a Stand, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/business/uber-drivers-and-others-in-thegig-economy-take-a-stand.html (discussing differences between Uber and online markets eBay and
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other service platforms likewise do not dictate product and service
specifications, work rules, and production tools to the extent of Uber and
Lyft.1 90

Firms and markets entail trade-offs in Coasian theory: Firms
allocate resources faster and with less waste and redundancy, while
markets allow adaptability to changing conditions. 191 Sometimes the
extra "noise" in markets is where novel interests and niche desires
ferment. 19 2 In explaining its operations, Uber emphasizes that it
coordinates production inputs to avoid competition among input
providers and other market dynamics that might lead to redundancy or
wasted time and resources. 19 3 As Lyft explains, it notifies "one specific
driver" upon receipt of a passenger request, "match[es]" the driver with
194
the passenger, and assigns another driver if too much time passes.
If Uber and Lyft are in fact market facilitators, they are bad at it.
Under ideal accounts of economic organization, markets work best in
allocating resources to their most valued uses when participants have
195 This is likewise
information about available options and alternatives.
where exogenous preferences can enter, contributing to dynamism in the
products and services produced. 196 The market Uber and Lyft claim to
intermediate operates according to the opposite principle-controlling
7
The software is
flows of information to network participants. 19
designed to prevent the driver and passenger it matches from seeing and
bargaining with any others.1 98 In supposedly purchasing "access" to the
Uber and Lyft "network[s]," passengers and drivers receive information
incrementally (e.g., revealing the destination to the driver only after the
driver accepts the assignment) and partially (e.g., revealing to the
Etsy; sellers of services versus goods).
190. See id.
191.

See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST

IMPLICATIONS 113-14 (The Free Press 1975); see also Perrow, supranote 157, at 31.
192. See, e.g., Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 172, at 10.
193. See Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 85, 86-88 [hereinafter
Rogers, Social Cost] (Illustrating the messy bargaining in taxi markets and attendant uncertainty,

redundancy, and waste that Uber eliminated by appropriation. Rogers discusses a "vicious cycle for
phone-dispatched cabs. Riders who get tired of waiting for a dispatched cab may simply hail
another on the street; drivers en route to a rider may also decide to take another fare from the street,

rationally estimating that the rider who called may have already found another car.").
194.

Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 86, at 4. The customer provides production inputs

in services involving customer interaction. When you buy a pedicure, for example, your feet are
production inputs.
195. See, e.g., Dahlman, supra note 137, at 147-48.
196. See id at 151.
197. See, e.g., Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 172, at 4, 12.
198 See id. at 4.
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passenger a driver's star rating but not passenger comments or the
number of rides the driver has performed).1 99
Many of the efficiencies Uber and Lyft achieve in streamlining ride
services are, within Coasian theory, a result of firm integration, of
replacing the market exchange activities (or inter-firm transaction costs)
that other taxi companies incur with agency costs (intra-firm
activities). 20 0 TCE theorizes that firm production, or centralized
direction, tends to entail more costs in direction and supervision than of
finding information and negotiating.201 Here, Uber and Lyft save on the
transaction costs of locating and negotiating with independent
companies who can offer assets, skills, or experience. 202 The companies
use standardized, non-negotiable agreements. 20 3 The drivers are at-will,
alleviating the need to negotiate the crucial parameters of performance
upfront. 204 The agreements give the companies rather open-ended
authority to direct and evaluate the drivers as they go along.20 5 Instead,
Uber and Lyft are engaged in the quintessential intra-firm activities of
monitoring, providing feedback, and disciplining drivers.206
The narrative is correct that Uber and Lyft have substantially
lowered market transaction costs, particularly search costs, relative to
traditional taxi companies.20 7 However, from a Coasian perspective,
they have lowered these costs between the companies themselves, as
transportation sellers, and riders, not between driver-sellers and riders.20 8
199. See id. at 4, 12.
200. See, e.g., Rogers, Social Cost, supra note 193, at 86-87; Rosenblat & Stark, supra note
172, at 10.
201. E.g., Williamson, Economics, supra note 128, at 564-65.
202. Uber's hiring process involved an interview, background check, vehicle inspection, and
"city knowledge test." O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
Lyft does not require an exam. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
203. See, e.g., Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1071-72; see generally Centronics Corp. v. Genicom
Corp., 562 A.2d 187, 187 (N.H. 1989) (discussing parties' responsibilities and intent to be bound by
a contract); Sun Printing & Publ'g Ass'n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 139 N.E. 470, 471
(N.Y. 1923) (discussing one's duty in relation a contractual agreement).
204. Contract law generally requires that parties specify important terms upfront, to avoid
ambiguity and quarrels, and so that parties to an agreement would know where they stand. See, e.g.,

Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471-72 (finding that the parties to the contract had failed to agree as to
both the quantity and duration terms of the agreement for future dealings, and therefore had an
unenforceable "agreement to agree"); Centronics, 562 A.2d at 191 (noting the common law

requirement that parties perform contractual obligations in good faith and consistent with "the
parties agreed-upon common purposes and justified expectations).
205. See Rosenblat & Stark, supranote 172, at 11.
206. Id. at 8-11.
207. Rogers, Social Cost, supranote 193, at 88.
208. Id. (explaining how Uber reduces search costs and uncertainty between transportation
companies and passengers, and the problem faced by phone-dispatched cabs due to high search
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An antitrust suit against Uber helps to illustrate the above
insights. 2 09 By disavowing its status as a firm that produced ride
services, but appropriating the market's coordinating mechanism of
price competition among drivers, Uber made itself vulnerable to claims
of a per se illegal restraint of trade.2 10
In Meyer v. Kalanick, an Uber passenger, on behalf of a class of
Uber passengers, sued Uber's CEO, Travis Kalanick, for orchestrating a
211
The Sherman Act
price-fixing conspiracy under the Sherman Act.
restraint of
unreasonable
an
prohibits combinations that constitute
2 12
The Plaintiff alleged that Kalanick had organized both a
trade.
vertical and horizontal combination.2 13 A vertical combination is an
agreement between buyers and sellers to set resale prices, and a
horizontal combination is an agreement among competitors to set
prices.214 The more serious charge was that of a horizontal restraint,
because these were "per se" illegal, whereas courts evaluate vertical
215
The
restraints under a more contextual "rule of reason" standard.
to
Uber
with
agree
"drivers
that
was
basis of the horizontal allegation
Uber
other
all
charge certain fares with the clear understanding that
drivers are agreeing to charge the same fares," and therefore could not
undercut one another on price.216 Judge Rakoff denied Kalanick's
motion to dismiss, ruling that the Plaintiff had adequately pleaded both
2 7
an illegal vertical and horizontal restraint. 1
Whether Kalanick had organized only a vertical combination, but
not a horizontal, per se illegal one, pivoted on the distinction raised in
the Uber narrative: Was Uber in the business of producing ride services
costs); see also Lobel, supra note 63, at 18-19 (further arguing that driver information provided by
In substantially reducing firm-customer
the application reduces information asymmetries).
transaction costs and intra-firm transaction costs, Uber has been able to offer a qualitatively new
service (or new kind of transaction) on-demand rides. See id. at 19-20 (suggesting Uber represents

a case of market differentiation). Gone are the days of jockeying among dozens of other patrons
after the nightclub closes for a competitive position on the street from which to hail a taxi.
209. See Meyer v. Kalanick, No. 15 Civ. 9796, 2016 WL 1266801 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
2016), reconsideration denied in part, No. 15 Civ. 9796, 2016 WL 2659591 (S.D.N.Y. May 9,
2016).
210. See id. at *3.
211. Id. at *1.
212. See id. at *3.
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at *3-4.
217. Id. at *3-5. Because Uber maintained that the drivers were not its employees, the
plaintiffs easily demonstrated the threshold issue that the drivers and Kalanick, an occasional Uber
driver, were "legally distinct economic entities." Id. at *3, *6.
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or was it only an intermediary?2 18 Kalanick claimed that the Plaintiff
had at most indicated a vertical arrangement between Uber and each
driver, not a horizontal agreement among drivers.29 He analogized the
case to one in which retailers agree with a manufacturer not to discount
the resale prices of the manufacturer's goods by more than a certain
amount, an arrangement courts have found to be legal.22 0 Judge Rakoff
disagreed, distinguishing the Uber arrangements from that of the
retailers and manufacturer on the basis of Uber's own characterization of
itself, as pleaded in the complaint: "Uber is not selling anything to
drivers that is then resold to riders." 2 2 1 The Uber narrative redounded to
Kalanick's detriment.222
Within classic firm theory, Uber and Lyft are not, and do not depict
their operations as, market facilitators that use technology to lower the
transaction costs between parties residing beyond their organizational
frontiers. 223 A market mediator of such stentorian disposition is a firm
within Coasian theory, which conceptualized the firm as a centrally
coordinated market. Rather, Uber and Lyft more closely resemble
Coase's "entrepreneur-co-ordinators," 224 directing resources in the
production and sale of on-demand ride services. As discussed further in
Part IV.C., technology has helped Uber and Lyft lower the costs of firm
production. The companies do not have to purchase or lease certain
inputs to production--cars-in order to control the production of their
branded ride services.22 5

218. Id. at *4.
219. See id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at *6 (contrasting the instant matter to Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007)).
222. The plaintiff also alleged that a successful organizing effort by New York drivers to
persuade Uber to raise fares was evidence of an illegal conspiracy. See id. at *2, *5. While it's
unclear what role this allegation played in the Judge's ruling, it augurs the troubling prospect of
using antitrust law to suppress workers from organizing. See Sanjukta M. Paul, The Enduring
Ambiguities ofAntitrust Liabilityfor Worker Collective Action, 47 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 969, 969 (2016)
("Such workers find themselves in the position of most workers prior to the New Deal: at once
lacking labor protections, yet exposed to antitrust liability for organizing to improve their
conditions.").
223. See Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 172, at 13-14 (Uber is a company that manages "the
infrastructure for 'on-demand' economy transactions" via "platform-based workers" whose work is
indirectly monitored by user feedback.). In addition to a direct and express fiat, Uber uses indirect
incentives to coordinate drivers' work. See id. at 13.
224. See Coase, Nature, supranote 4, at 388.
225. See id. at 392.
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REJECTING THE CLASSIC FIRM-CORPORATION NEXUS

How should we understand the Uber narrative if Uber and Lyft
have not, from the perspective of Coasian firm theory, used technology
to displace the firm? Lurking within the narrative is a rejection of
classic theory's normative relationship between the firm and
corporation.
A. The Firm-CorporationNexus
Firm theorists have assumed that the corporation was the natural
22 6
The unified governance
business form for the firm to assume.
2 27
Thus,
structure of production would have a unified legal personality.
the
to
correspond
should
boundaries
corporate
that
Chandler theorized
22 8
fastthat
suggested
He
boundaries of the industrial enterprise.
developing technology, the efficiencies of the separation of conception
and execution, and economies of scale in some U.S. industries in the late
19th and early 20th centuries created the need for more financing than
available through a single proprietorship, prompting firms to
incorporate.229 Other theorists, like Oliver Hart, suggested that financial
230
Famed
structure should reflect how production was organized.
social
representative
"The
claimed:
Drucker
Peter
theorist
management
mass-production
the
are
time
our
of
system
phenomena of the industrial
plant and the corporation. The assembly line is the representative
material environment; the corporation is the representative social
institution." 2 31 The corporation was the firm's proper manifestation as
formal organization, legal individual, and financial framework.232
In presupposing an efficiency relationship between the corporation
and productive enterprise, these theories defined a normative
relationship between them.233 They offer an ideal of how economic
accumulation should work under capitalism: The point of the
226. Kraakman, supranote 17, at 148-49.
227. Id. (arguing the corporation "possess[es] key attributes of legal personality" that explain
why the "corporate form . .. dominates the organization of large-scale business enterprise in every
jurisdiction, from Delaware to Japan").
228. See CHANDLER, supra note 124, at 330-32.
229. See id. at 330-39.
230. Hart, supra note 129, at 1773.
231. PETER F. DRUCKER, THE FUTURE OF INDUSTRIAL MAN 74 (Transaction Publishers 1995)
(1942).
232. See Kraakman, supra note 17, at 148-51.
233. See id. at 151.
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corporation was to help the firm maximize profit through productive
activity, excelling at the efficient production and sale of goods and
services.2 34 This was its only legitimate basis and its raison d'8tre. 235
Thus, corporate boundaries-corporate identity-should reflect the
boundaries of productive enterprise.
Theories suggesting how corporations should carry out its purpose
have varied.236 Taylorism directed companies to focus on engineering
and bureaucratization.2 37 Drucker argued that companies should pay
more attention to company politics and help workers feel less like
automatons. 238 Chandler theorized that companies maximized efficiency
by improving throughput.239 Under TCE, companies minimized agency
and contracting costs. 24 0 Ronald Dore's theory of dynamic production
urged companies to maintain flexible production capabilities.2 41
While contesting the whether and how of the matter, most theories
of corporate governance likewise assumed that the companies should
maximize profit through productive enterprise.24 2 They posed the
problem as one of disciplining and incentivizing managers to prevent
them from deviating from this strategy given a separation of shareholder
ownership from management control.243
However, the purpose of the corporation to facilitate productive
enterprise was so taken for granted the terms "corporation" and "firm"
became near metonyms.244
234. See id. (explaining that the corporate form helps the firm in "raising capital, controlling
agency costs, facilitating decision-making, and allocating risk among participants in the firm").
235. See, e.g., id (discussing the importance of the corporation, its now universal use and
benefit and the unlikeliness of it changing or disappearing as a going concern).
236.
237.

See FLIGSTEIN, supra note 157, at 33.
PETER F. DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 22, 192 (Transaction Publishers

1993) (1946).
238. Id. at 22.
239.

CHANDLER, supra note 124, at 241.

240.

Perrow, supranote 157, at 11, 16, 19.

241. See RONALD P. DORE, FLEXIEBLE RIGIDITIES: INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENT IN THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 1970-80 248-252 (1986).

242. Cf Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory ofthe Firm: ManagerialBehavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11(1976) (proposing a theory of

corporate governance not centered on facilitating productive enterprise).
243. See EDWARD S. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER: A TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND STUDY 257-58 (1981); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Marketfor Corporate

Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 113 (arguing that possibility of corporate take-over disciplines
managers utilize to run the enterprise efficiently, as reflected in share price).
244. E.g., Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1201 (1984)
(discussing "corporate" and "firm" governance interchangeably); Kraakman, supra note 17, at 147
("The company, the corporation, the enterprise-the firm by any name. . . ."); see generally

DiMaggio, Introduction,supra note 159.
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B. Disappointingthe Ideal
In U.S. history, the normative nexus between firm and corporation
245
Companies deviated from
was an ideal that reality often disappointed.
24 6
the norms of profit seeking that major accounts of the firm prescribed.
The emergence of the large industrial corporation in the U.S. belies
the ideal-large manufacturing enterprises incorporated not because the
corporate form was the best way to finance efficient production, but to
form holding companies when the federal government began cracking
down on trusts.247 Most of the history of the rise of the large U.S.
industrial corporation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries is a story
about quashing markets through cartels, then trusts, and then holding
companies, not embracing them.248
As another example, under TCE, company size should reflect
249
However, U.S.
transaction cost savings from vertical integration.
or to save
economies
scale
realize
to
not
size
pursued
corporations long
or
control
to
which
by
power
on contracting costs, but to gain market
250
Size sometimes conferred political power as
undercut competitors.
well, enabling companies to shape state policy to improve their
Companies for many decades grew large
competitive position.2 5 '
25 2
through conglomerate mergers or horizontal integration.
Corporate strategies defied the predictions of major economic
theories of the firm-that corporations would pursue profit253
maximization through the efficient production of goods and services.

245. See Paul DiMaggio, Conclusion: The Futures ofBusiness Organizationand Paradoxesof
Change, in THE TwENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 210, 211-12 (Paul DiMaggio ed., Princeton Univ. Press 2001)

[hereinafter DiMaggio, Conclusion].
246. The assumption that business organization would reflect the organization of productive
activity accounts for some of the apparent explanatory weakness of TCE. See, e.g., Perrow, supra
note 157, at 24, 33 (critiquing TCE for its inability to explain corporate mergers).
247. RoY, supra note 157, at 17-18.
248.
249.

See FLIGSTEIN, supra note 157, at 38-43.
See Perrow,supra note 157, at 21.

250. See id.
251.

HERMAN, supranote 243, at 180; see Perrow, supra note 157, at 34-35.

252. See Perrow, supra note 157, at 24 (arguing that TCE did not explain company size,
because most large companies were created through mergers with companies in unrelated
industries).

253. See id. To some extent, the operations of large companies in the U.S. between the 1930s
and 1970s comported with the ideals of firm theory. FLIGSTEIN, supranote 157, at 27-28. Fligstein
found that large companies sought to maximize profits through the efficient production and sale of
goods and services, for instance, by minimizing costs and maximizing revenue through product
differentiation and finding new markets. See id However, he also found that companies often
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C. The Weakening Firm-CorporationNexus and the Postindustrial
Corporation
Evidence suggests that since the 1970s we have witnessed the
emergence of another challenge to the ideal of the corporation as the
helpful servant of the firm-a post-firm, or what this Article will refer to
as the "postindustrial" corporation. 2 5
The postindustrial corporation
seeks to maximize profit, but. not necessarily through productive
enterprise.255 Rather, it may create shareholder value by other means,
like asset manipulation, speculative activity, and, most pertinent here,
regulatory arbitrage.25 6
Changes in corporate governance have untethered the corporation
from productive enterprise. They have disassociated corporations from
certain product lines, from industries, and sometimes from productive
activity altogether.2 57
Several developments contributed to these
changes, including state policy, the relative increase of the service
sector, technological change, growth in global competition and markets,
and the increasing power of financial markets.25 8
Neil Fligstein traces the "financial conception" of corporate control
to the 1960s; as firms diversified into unrelated markets, management
developed and adopted financial controls to address their limited
expertise. 2 5 9 They evaluated each division as a profit center and began
to see the corporation as a diversified "portfolio of businesses." 2 60 These
businesses were still productive enterprises, but managing the portfolio
rather than production and sales became the key to corporate

sought size and market share not because this was the best way to realize scale economies or
minimize production costs, but to protect themselves from competition. See id. For example,
market share could enable a company to set prices and thereby undercut competitors too small to
fare well in price wars. See id.
254. See, e.g., DiMaggio, Conclusion, supra note 245, at 211-12.
255.

GERALD DAVIS, MANAGED BY MARKETS: How FINANCE RESHAPED AMERICA 239

(2009) ("The boundaries around finance as an industry became increasingly porous during the
1990s and 2000s, as many kinds of firms earned much of their profit in financial activities even if
they were nominally in non-financial industries (e.g.[,] GE, GM, Enron).") (emphasis in original).
256. See id.; see also, e.g., Bratton & Levitin, supra note 24, at 787, 788 (discussing special
purpose entities as "legally distinct entities that companies use" for "arbitraging accounting rules
and . .. regulatory capital requirements" and that "never fully coalesce as independent organizations
that take actions in pursuit of business goals").
257. Krippner, supranote 20, at 175-76, 199; FLIGSTEIN, supra note 157, at 229.
258.

See generally PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK: MANAGING THE MARKET-

DRIVEN WORKFORCE (1999) (discussing several causes of corporate restructuring).
259. FLIGSTEIN, supra note 157, at 228.
260. DAVIS, supra note 255, at 78; see FLIGSTEIN, supranote 157, at 228-29.
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governance.261 Companies were willing to divest divisions with
relatively poor performance and sought profit via mergers rather than
2 62
internal development of new goods and services.
In the 1980s and 1990s, many companies began to perceive
263
To deal with possible
flexibility as central to corporate governance.
firms sought to
qualitative,
and
quantitative
both
demand,
in
fluctuations
and product or
processes
production
maintain the ability to shift among
2
service lines. 64 Economies of flexibility became more important than
scale economies.265 While these practices still appear consistent with
maximizing profit via productive activity, at some point flexibility and
the financial conception sometimes eclipsed the former as a profit
seeking strategy.266
Theories of financialization provide evidence that companies have
26 7
The rising
reoriented their decision making to financial markets.
institutional
of
power
the
including
hegemony of capital markets,
investors and private equity funds, has pressured companies to look to
shorter-term profit horizons.2 68 Capital markets not only led to the
breakup of conglomerates, but also pushed firms to de-integrate, to
261. See DAVIS, supra note 255, at 78; FLIGSTEIN, supra note 157, at 228-29; BEVERLY J.
SILVER, FORCES OF LABOR: WORKERS' MOVEMENTS AND GLOBALIZATION SINCE 1870 176

(Cambridge Univ. Press 2003) (discussing the "financial fix" as a strategy for overcoming obstacles
to capitalist accumulation).
262. See FLIGSTEIN, supra note 157, at 227-29. Fligstein argues that the financial conception
of profit seeking motivated disparate corporate tactics-the mergers that created multiconglomerates in the 1960s, but also the LBOs and divestments that left companies more
industrially focused in the 1980s. Id.
263.

See MANUEL CASTELLS, TIE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY 167 (2d ed. 2010).

264.

WElL, supra note 26, at 279.

265.

See, e.g., CHRISTIAN MARAZZI, CAPITAL AND AFFECTS: THE POLITICS OF THE LANGUAGE

ECONOMY 105-06 (Giuseppina Mecchia trans., Semiotext 2011) (1994); WEIL, supra note 26, at
289; see also CASTELLS, supra note 263, at 167; Stephen S. Cohen & John Zysman, Why
Manufacturing Matters: The Myth of the Post-IndustrialEconomy, 29 CAL. MGMT REV. 9, 23
(1987) (discussing product and process flexibility).
266. See CASTELLS, supra note 263, at 167-68; DAVIS, supra note 255, at 93; Natascha van der
Zwan, Making Sense of Financialization, 12 SOClo-ECON. REV. 99, 108 (2014) (citing studies
indicating that companies today are distributing financial gains through financial channels rather
than reinvesting them in productive facilities).
267. DAVIS, supra note 255, at 1; Matthew Soener, Why Do Firms Financialize?Meso-Level
Evidence from the US Apparel and FootwearIndustry, 1991-2005,13 Socio-ECON. REV. 549, 55051 (2015) (defining the financialization of companies in terms of both an increased responsiveness
to financial markets and strategy of financial accumulation).
268.

MICHAEL USEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM: How MONEY MANAGERS ARE CHANGING THE

FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA 117-18 (BasicBooks 1996); WELL, supra note 26, at 45-47; see
generally Cynthia A. Williams & Peer Zumbansen, The Embedded Firm: Corporate Governance,
Labor, and Finance Capitalism 477-82 (Osgoode Hall Law Sch. of York Univ., Research Report
No. 18/2011, 2011).
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69

This "fissuring"
assumes a variety of forms: Franchising, subcontracting, independent
contracting, subsidiary creation, and buyer-driven supply chains.270
While at first, firms tended to de-integrate ancillary services, like
accounting, fissuring spread to activities at the core of the company's
product or service lines. 2 7 1 Moreover, non-financial firms have been
earning a greater share of income through portfolio activity than sales.272
"[S]ize [still] matters," but as measured by the company's market
capitalization rather than its assets or number of employees.2 73
The conventional wisdom today is that the stock market values
ideational assets more than material assets.274
Companies attract
investors by marketing themselves as "high tech" businesses. 275
Companies with no track record, reputation, revenue, or product to sell
have issued IPOs. 2 76 Many companies became "hollowed out," a
"business specialized in intermediation between financing, production,
and market sales, on the basis of an established trade mark or industrial
,,277
image.
Yet the assets and operations of many companies are not
simply more intangible and "knowledge-based," but often more
ephemeral and illusory as well.278 The CEO of Sara Lee once remarked
that Wall Street seeks the most profit with the least assets.279
In the postindustrial corporation, the norm of maximizing profits
through the resourceful and innovative management of production and

269.

See DAVIS, supranote 255, at 31, 93-94; WEIL, supra note 26, at 44, 51.

270. See WEIL, supra note 26, at 94, 168.
271. See id. at 160.
272. See Krippner, supra note 20, at 186; see also Donald Tomaskovic-Devey et al., Did
Financialization Reduce Economic Growth?, 13 Socio-EcoN. REV. 525, 527 (2015); see also
Soener, supra note 267, at 550-51 (2015) (finding that branded marketers, companies with high
levels of intagible assets, are also more likely to turn to portfolio activity as an income strategy than
companies with more tangible assets, and suggesting that their focus on brand imaging better
positions them to financialize in this manner).
273.
274.

DAVIS, supranote 255, at 13.
Ben McClure, Intangible Assets Provide Real

Value to Stocks, INVESTOPEDIA,

http://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/010603.asp (last visited Dec. 26, 2016).
275. Lilly Irani, Difference and Dependence among Digital Workers: The Case of Amazon
Mechanical Turk, 114 S. ATLANTIC Q. 225, 230 (2015).
276. See DAVIS, supranote 255, at 15.
277. CASTELLS, supra note 263, at 176 (discussing lean production in the 1990s).
278. See id. at 124; DAVIS, supra note 255, at 95 (describing the valuation of the "weightless
post-industrail firm" based on its social capital as having a "certain Potemkin Village aspect"); cf
Soener, supra note 267, at 567 (finding evidence that companies focused on "design, marketing, and
brand imaging" are more likely to seek growth through financial channels rather than productive
activity compared to companies with greater tangible assets).
279. DAVIS, supra note 255, at 21.
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marketing has atrophied.2 80 Evidence suggests that a new system of
This
corporate governance has flourished since the 1990s. 28 1
postindustrial corporation apotheosizes stock value. Its devotional
votives are short-term profit horizons, accounting manipulation, and a
"buy or sell," or even a "gamble" rather than "make" philosophy.28 2 To
update Marx's pantomime of an old confrontation between the bourgeois
entrepreneur and landowner, the "noble lineage" of making and selling
things is becoming a "feudal souvenir.",2 83
This assault on the ideal account of the corporation has damaged its
normative fortifications as well as its empirical ones.284 The normative
ascent of the postindustrial corporation is apparent in what is arguably
the most influential theory of corporate governance today, the "nexus of
contracts" theory.285 While dubbing itself a theory of the firm,
productive enterprise makes little appearance in this theory. 286 "The
private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which
serves as a nexus for contracting relationships"tamong consumers,
managers, workers, and investors, alike, not an organization that
produces goods and services for sale.287 The corporation has swallowed
and digested the firm. 28 8

The economist David Weil addresses the relationship between the
289
He explains the
postindustrial corporation and employment.
disassociation between the boundaries of the formal business entity and
boundaries of productive units since the 1960s as a theory of "fissured
employment." 2 90 Companies "shed" productive activity into formally

See id.
See id. at 22.
See id. at 21-22; Ronald Dore, Financializationof the Global Economy, 17 INDUS.

&

280.
281.
282.

CORP. CHANGE 1097, 1099-100, 1103-04 (2008); DOUG HENWOOD, WALL STREET 171 (Verso

1998) (1997); see also Bratton & Levitin, supra note 24, at 865 (discussing the proliferation of
Special Purpose Entities that enable companies to game accounting rules).
283.

KARL MARX, ECONOMIC & PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844 38 (Dirk J. Struik ed.,

Martin Milligan trans., Progress Publishers, 1959) (proofed and corrected in 2009 by Matthew
Carmody).
284.

See DAVIS, supra note 255, at 99.

285. Jensen & Meckling, supranote 242, at 310-11; see also DAVIS, supra note 255, at 82-83,
87, 91-92.
286. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 242, at 310.
287. Id. at 311 (emphasis added) (suggesting organizations lack a social and economic
existence apart from their legal form); DAVIS, supranote 255, at 94-95.
288. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 242, at 310-11.
289.

See WEIL, supra note 26, at 7.

290. Id. at 7-25; see also Hugh Collins, Ascription of Legal Responsibility to Groups in
Complex Patterns of Economic Integration, 53 MOD. L. REV. 731, 732, 736-37, 740 (1990)
(discussing the disjuncture between formal business boundaries and the boundaries of integrated
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separate entities, like subcontractors and franchises, and then disclaimed
their role as the employer of workers in these entities.2 91 Weil's
nomenclature-that companies are "shedding employment"-reflects a
weakening nexus between productive enterprise and business form. 2 92 If
the company sheds employment, can we call what crawls out of the
crumpled skein that remains a "firm"? What then is the social warrant
of the corporation? This is the conundrum the courts confronted in
O'Connor and Cotter in contending with the Uber narrative.2 93
D. Contendingwith the Uber Narrative
In Cotter and O'Connor, the judges engaged competing notions of
corporate legitimacy when they addressed Uber and Lyft's claims about
their business identity.29 4 Recall that the companies claimed that they
were in the business of "technology," not transportation services.295
They administered technology that lowered the costs of market exchange
between independent sellers and buyers.296 Therefore, the drivers
resided outside the bounds of their enterprises.297 The courts refused to
grant summary judgment to Uber and Lyft, finding that the drivers
performed services for them and the companies could not demonstrate as
a matter of law that they did so as independent contractors.29 8
If the only legitimate role of the corporate form was as a helpful
servant to the firm, it followed that a company's business identity should
be based on the fruits of its centralized coordination, namely, its product
markets. 29 9 The fruits of centralized coordination were its license to use
enterprises).
291. See WEIL, supra note 26, at 56-57.
292. Id. at 43-44, 57.
293. See O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1141-43 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see
also Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
294. See O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1141-43; see also Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1078-79.
295. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1137, 1141; Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1078.
296. See O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1141; see also Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1070-71.
297. See O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1137-38; Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1078.
298. Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1078; O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1135, 1141. In Cotter, the
Judge granted preliminary approval of a proposed class action settlement. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No.
13-cv-04065-VC, 2016 WL 3561742, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2016). It will not alter drivers'
independent contractor status. Id. In O'Connor, the Judge rejected a proposed settlement that
would have covered all Uber drivers in California and Massachusetts and likewise would not have
changed the drivers' employment status. O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-03826-EMC,
15-cv-00262-EMC, 2016 WL 4398271, at *1-2, *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2016). The judge rejected
the settlement in large part because it valued the plaintiffs non-waivable claims under California's
Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) at around .1% of their potential verdict value. Id. at * 18.
299. See supra section W.A.; Coase, Nature, supra note 4, at 389-91; Williamson,
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the corporate form. 300
The judges' understanding of business identity in O'Connor and
Cotter reflects the notion of corporate legitimacy assumed in Coasian
theory.301 In O'Connor, the judge termed Uber's argument that it was
3 02
only a technology company "fatally flawed in numerous respects."
He argued:
Uber does not simply sell software; it sells rides. Uber
is no more a "technology company" than Yellow Cab is
a "technology company" because it uses CB radios to
dispatch taxi cabs, John Deere is a "technology
company" because it uses computers and robots to
manufacture lawn mowers, or Domino Sugar is a
"technology company" because it uses modem irrigation
techniques to grow its sugar cane. Indeed, very few (if
any) firms are not technology companies if one focuses
solely on how they create or distribute their products.303
Uber acknowledged that its revenue depended on selling rides and
Uber argued: "We
that it advertised itself as a transportation service.
we do. And
what
That's
software.
make our money from licensing
giving them the right to use it. And we happen to have a compensation
30 5
model that, when they use it successfully, we get compensated."
The judge rejected this argument, finding that what Uber produced
and sold were transportation services: "Uber does not sell its software in
Transaction-Cost Economics, supra note 124, at 247-53 (arguing that different governance
structures should reflect different types of productive exchanges).
300. See supra section W.A.; Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics, supra note 124, at
250, 252-53.
301. See Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1078-79; O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1142-43; Coase,
Nature, supra note 4, at 388-91.
302. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1141; see also Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of Cal. v. Uber
Techs., Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1082-83 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (rejecting argument that Uber was not
subject to the ADA because it was a "technology" company rather than a "public accommodation");
Reardon v. Uber Techs., Inc., 115 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding that Uber sells
transportation services and is not primarily a technology company); Bureau of Labor & Industries,
Advisory Opinion of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries of the State of
14,
2015),
(Oct.
Drivers
of Uber
Status
Employment
The
on
Oregon
http://uberlawsuit.com/Oregon.pdf (advisory opinion by Commissioner Brad Avakian arguing that
driving was "integral" to Uber's business and ultimately finding that the drivers were employees).
303. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1141.
304. Transcript,supra note 92, at 16 ("[T]he fact that we benefit from these individuals using
our apps simply makes them a customer.').
305. Id.
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the manner of a typical distributor. Rather, Uber is deeply involved in
marketing its transportation services, qualifying and selecting drivers,
regulating and monitoring their performance, disciplining (or
terminating) those who fail to meet standards, and setting prices."306
Technology was simply the means by which Uber coordinated this
production: "Uber's self-definition as a mere 'technology company'
focuses exclusively on the mechanics of its platform (i.e., the use of
internet enabled smartphones and software applications) rather than on
the substance of what Uber actually does (i.e., enable customers to book
and receive rides)." 30 7
The judge also rejected Uber's attempt to uncouple its business
identity from its marketing. 308 Uber disagreed that marketing itself as a
transportation company meant it was a transportation company.309 The
judge noted, however, "Uber could not be 'Everyone's Private Driver'
without the drivers."31 0
The judge suggests that a company's business identity, its corporate
form, should reflect the organization of productive activity: "Even more
fundamentally, it is obvious drivers perform a service for Uber because
Uber simply would not be a viable business entity without its drivers."3 11
Similarly, the Cotter judge perceived Lyft's argument about its
business identity as being "obviously wrong" and rejected the narrative
of transaction costs and technology: 3 12
Lyft concerns itself with far more than simply
connecting random users of its platform. It markets
itself to customers as an on-demand ride service, and it
actively seeks out those customers. It gives drivers
detailed instructions about how to conduct themselves.
Notably, Lyft's own drivers' guide and FAQs state that
drivers are "driving for Lyft." Therefore, the argument
that Lyft is merely a platform, and that drivers perform
no service for Lyft, is not a serious one.3 13

306. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1137, 1142 ("Uber's revenues do not depend on the
distribution of its software, but on the generation of rides by its drivers.").
307. Id. at 1141.
308. Id. at 1141-43.
309. See Transcript, supra note 92, at 21-22.
310. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1144.
311. Id. at 1142.
312. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
313. Id. (citations omitted).
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The O'Connor judge expressed dubiety regarding whether the
company's price setting and its monitoring and evaluation of driver
performance were consistent with Uber's claim that it mediated a
transportation market but did not sell transportation services (i.e., that it
did not "make" ride services):
So if they're only providing software, why would they
be concerned with who's buying it, whether they're
qualified, how they're doing on the job? And why
would they have control over the pricing.... Why are
they setting the rates by which drivers are getting
compensated? Why do they have a right to terminate
drivers under certain circumstances? 314
The judge suggests that Lyft had relinquished little control to the
market's decentralized and competitive currents.3 15
The California Labor Commissioner has also rejected the Uber
narrative: "Defendants hold themselves out as nothing more than a
neutral technological platform, designed simply to enable drivers and
passengers to transact the business of transportation. The reality,
however, is that Defendants are involved in every aspect of the
operation." 3 16 The Commissioner also invoked a Taylorist division of
labor, the separation of management and execution, to suggest that Uber
cannot define its business-its grounds for using the corporate form-as
pure management lacking any execution: "Plaintiffs work was integral
to Defendants' business. Defendants are in business to provide
Plaintiff did the actual
transportation services to passengers.
drivers such as Plaintiff,
Without
passengers.
those
of
transporting
3 17
Defendants' business would not exist."
In the above cases, decision makers rejected the Uber narrative and
found instead that the companies produced, marketed, and sold ride
31 8
services, and that these activities defined their business identities.
Uber and Lyft were not legitimate-"viable"-if their business identities
were based on the activity of coordination alone, and abjured the fruits

314. Transcript, supra note 92, at 17, 19.
315. See id. at 19-100.
316. Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 11-46739 EK at 9 (Cal. Lab. Comm., June 3, 2015).
317. Id. at 8.
318. O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1141-42, 1145 (N.D. Cal. 2015);
Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1078.
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of that coordination.3 19
Gestating within the Uber narrative is a different conception of the
corporation than that prescribed by classic firm theory. 320 The Uber
narrative betrays the weakening normative nexus between the firm and
corporation rather than the disintegration of the firm. 32 1 As illustrated in
Cotter and O'Connor, it attempts to both obscure and legitimatize a
tenuous connection between business organization and the organization
of productive activity.3 22
V. WHAT MAKES THE UBER NARRATIVE SEEM PLAUSIBLE?

Some decision makers have been responsive to Uber's definition of
its business as "technology," despite its estrangement from Uber's
product markets.323 In denying unemployment benefits to drivers, a
Florida agency found, "Uber is a technology platform that, for a fee,
connects
transportation
providers
with
customers
seeking
transportation," and it made a version of the technology-andtransaction cost argument: "Modem technology is enabling a rapidly
evolving and expanding network of willing buyers and sellers to open
once-restricted markets and efficiently allocate resources."3 24 The
California Labor Commission found that "Uber's 'business was engaged
in technology and not in the transportation industry,' and thus the
'services Plaintiff [the driver] provided were not part of the business
3 25
operated by the Defendant."'
Why are decision makers, academics, and others prepared to accept
Uber's tender of a new social rationale for the corporation, one that
unmoors it from productive enterprise? Some are inspired (or distracted)

319. Transcript, supra note 92, at 67 ("Uber has done so many things to make sure that the
transportation that people are partaking in, purchasing, is a good one, a responsive one, a quality
one, which transcend the mere sale of a piece of software.").
320. See Julia Tomassetti, It's None of Our Business: The PostindustrialCorporationand the
Guy with a CarAs Entrepreneur,Soc'Y FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF Socio-ECON. (June 24, 2016),

https://sase.confex.com/sase/2016am/webprogram/Paper5157.html.
321. See id.
322. See O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1141-42, 1145; see also Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1078.
323. See Tomassetti, It's None of Our Business, supra note 320.
324. Final Order, supranote 43, at 1-2.
325. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1144 n.14. Also, agencies in some eleven states have found
Uber drivers to be independent contractors. Celia Ampel, Florida: Uber Drivers Are Contractors,
Not
Employees,
DAILY
Bus.
REV.
(Dec.
4,
2015),
http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/id=1202743938454/Florida-Uber-Drivers-Are-ContractorsNot-Employees ("Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, New York,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah and Virginia").
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by the political promise of the "end of the firm" prophecy, discussed in
Part II.C. One decision includes a long encomium to Uber-like
technology's liberation of individual "entrepreneurs" from the firm,
including that "[t]hese platforms are helping people pursue what has
always been an important part of the American dream: to be one's own
boss."32 6
This Article hypothesizes other reasons, however, for why the
narrative appears plausible even to those who may be skeptical of its
ecclesiastical politics and reject the legitimacy of the postindustrial
corporation.
A. The Exceptional Qualities ofICTs
Part of the answer has to do with Uber's use of ICTs and the
narrative's appeal to this technology.327 First, for the Uber narrative to
be viable it must enable the company to don the guise of the legitimate
corporation of firm theory-an organization engaged in the coordination
of resources in the production of goods or services for sale-even
without the drivers' services.328 Second, it must disguise its centralized
coordination as decentralized market production with respect to the
company's relationship to its drivers. 3 29 To accomplish these objectives,
the narrative draws on discourses about the exceptional, almost mystical,
qualities of ICTs.
1.Concretizing Coordination: Assuming the Guise of the Classic
Firm
The Uber narrative appears more legible within Coasian accounts
of the firm than the business identities asserted by companies which do
33 0
Uber
not rely to the same extent on ICTs to coordinate production.
the
helps
which
"technology,"
sell
and
produce
they
that
and Lyft claim
the
without
even
firm,
Coasian
a
companies assume the guise of
drivers. 3 3 1 To see how, consider several disputes over employment
332
status under the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Law.

326.

Final Order, supra note 43, at 2.

327.

See Tomassetti, It's None of Our Business, supra note 320.

328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See Mass. Delivery Ass'n v. Coakley, 769 F.3d 11, 14, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding that
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Coverall sold commercial cleaning services and characterized the
janitors it hired as "franchisees" rather than employees.3 33 Unlike other
franchise models, like those in the fast food and auto dealerships,
Coverall negotiated and maintained client relationships.334 Franchisees
could not solicit or bid for clients.335 Coverall assigned janitors to clean
areas of its clients' commercial space, and janitors paid Coverall upfront
for the assignments and for use of Coverall's proprietary cleaning
system.336

Coverall provided training, often leased equipment to

janitors, and paid them directly, deducting fees and royalties from
monthly checks.337
This franchise system is common among mid-sized janitorial firms,
which dominate the commercial cleaning industry and account for the
majority of industry employment. 33 8 The business model has generated
rampant violations of basic workplace standards, however. 3 39 The
contracts that the cleaning companies negotiate with clients usually
make it impossible for franchisees to both break even and comply with
the law.34 0
For years, the franchise model for commercial cleaning operated
more or less without legal disturbance.3 4 1 Recently, however, janitors
sued Coverall and a similar company, Jani-King, in Massachusetts,
alleging that they were employees of the companies and had paid them
thousands of dollars for the opportunity to work a menial job.342
the FAAAA preempts the second "prong of the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Statute,
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, [section] 148B(a)(2), which requires that workers perform a service
'outside the usual course of the business of the employer' to be classified as independent
contractors"). Workers cannot be classified as employees just because they "perform delivery
services within the usual course of business for the delivery companies." Id. at 15; see also
Memorandum and Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at *3-5, Remington v. J.B. Hunt

Transport, Inc. No. 15-10010-RGS (D. Mass. Feb. 5, 2015) (demonstrating that the entire statute
must be treated as preempted, and "the FAAAA preempts section 148B as applied to motor
carriers").

333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 80, 81 (D. Mass. 2010).
See id. at 82-84; WEIL, supra note 26, at 134-35.
Awuah, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 82, 84; WEIL, supra note 26, at 134-35.
Awuah, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 82, 84; WEIL, supra note 26, at 134-35.
Awuah, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 84.
See WEIL, supra note 26, at 133.
See id. at 157.
Id. at 2, 140.

341.

See Carol Tice, FranchisorNightmare: The Scandal At Coverall, FORBES (May 11,

2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/caroltice/2012/05/ 1/are-some-franchisees-really-employees/.
342. Awuah, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 84; De Giovanni v. Jani-King Int'l, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 447
(D. Mass. 2013); Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing at 79, DeGiovanni v. Jani-King Int'l,
Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 447 (D. Mass. 2012) (No. 07-cv-10066-MLW) [hereinafter Transcript of
Hearing];WEIL, supranote 26, at 3 ("Pius Awuah, a resident of Lowell, Massachusetts, put his life
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To prevail on its claims that the janitors were indeed small business
owners and not employees, Coverall and Jani-King had to prove that the
343
janitors provided services "outside the usual course of [its] business."
The judge summarized Coverall's argument:
In its attempt to establish that Coverall and its
franchisees are in distinct businesses, Coverall argues
that it is not in the commercial cleaning business, but
rather it is in the franchising business. []Coverall argues
that it sells franchises and trains and supports the
franchises, but it does not clean any establishments, nor
does it employ anyone who cleans.344
The judge then quotes from a scholarly reference Coverall cites in
its motion, which defines franchising "'[i]n its broadest sense' as 'a
3
product or service distribution system."' 45 The judge comments:
These quotes suggest that franchising is not in itself a
business, rather a company is in the business of selling
goods or services and uses the franchise model as a
means of distributing the goods or services to the final
end user without acquiring significant distribution costs.
Describing franchising as a business in itself, as
Coverall seeks to do, sounds vaguely like a description
for a modified Ponzi scheme-a company that does not
earn money from the sale of goods and services, but
from taking in more money from unwitting franchisees
3 46
to make payments to previous franchisees.

savings into a Coverall franchise contract that in many respects was simply paying to be an
employee (who was then compensated in violation of minimum wages and overtime standards).").
343. MASS. GEN. L., ch. 149, tit. 11 § 148B(a)(2). The statute provided a three-prong test, and
The District of
See id.
the janitors' summary judgment motion turned on the second.
Massachusetts recently struck down the statute, finding that the FAAAA preempted it. Schwann v.

FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 11-1 1094-RGS, 2013 WL 3353776, at *4-5 (D. Mass. July 3,
2013), opinion withdrawn in part 2015 WL 501512 (D. Mass. Feb 5, 2015), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, remanded 813 F.3d 429 (1st Cir. 2016).
344. Awuah, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 82-83.
345. Id. at 84 (quoting George W. Mykulak and John S. Rhee, Franchise Disputes, 2 Bus.
TORTS IN MASS. § 15.2.2 (MCLE 2002)) (citing Coverall North America, Inc.'s Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2, Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 707 F.
Supp. 2d 80, 81 (D. Mass. 2010)).
346. Awuah, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 84.
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Then the judge notes that Coverall is not actually a Ponzi scheme,
however, because it did create and sell something-a cleaning system
and cleaning services.347 The court concludes, "[t]hese undisputed facts
establish that Coverall sells cleaning services, the same services
provided by these plaintiffs." 34 8
Here, Coverall argued that its business was managing the janitors,
but not actually cleaning.34 9 The judge rejected this argument.so In
essence, it tells Coverall, either you are a productive enterprise in the
business of commercial cleaning, making the janitors a part of your
enterprise, or you are a Ponzi scheme, a discredited kind of business. 3 5 1
You cannot simply be in the business of business-"franchising."3 52
Your business identity should reflect your product markets, the fruits of
your coordination.3 53
In the Jani-King suit, the company argued that the janitors
performed services outside its usual course of business because, "JaniKing develops a cleaning system and builds and enforces the Jani-King
brand. It does not perform cleaning services. That is what franchise
owners do. They deliver commercial cleaning services to [Jani-King's]
clients, and their businesses center around how to do that efficiently and
effectively."354
The court rejected Jani-King's argument:
[Jani-King] attempts to create a distinction between
different levels in the distribution of the service arguing
that the function it performs is not cleaning but
developing a cleaning system and promoting the brand.
To this end, the defendants [Jani-King] point out that
franchise owners do not perform the same tasks that
they perform because they do not sell franchises, bill
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 82.
350. Id at 83.
351. See id. at 83-85.
352. See id. at 83-84.
353. See id.
354. Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 2-3, De Giovanni v. Jani-King Int'l, Inc.,
968 F. Supp. 2d 447 (D. Mass. 2013) (No. 07-10066 MLW) [hereinafter Defendants'
Memorandum]. The central argument was that "Jani-King develops a cleaning system and
promotes and maintains the Jani-King brand. Jani-King franchise owners provide cleaning services
to the market. These are distinct courses of business, conducted at different levels of a system for
distributing a service." Id. at 17.
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clients, or develop proprietary materials. However, this
contention is inconsistent with the statutory test's focus
355
on the nature of the service provided by the business.
Jani-King described an allocation of specialized tasks undertaken
by the company and janitors to demonstrate it was engaged in market
exchange with the janitors.356 The court, however, suggests the
company has described not a market division of labor, but a firm
division of labor: Some Jani-King members undertook the work of
designing and selling cleaning services-conceiving and managing;
others, the janitors, executed the services. To the court, this described
the complementary tasks required to constitute a productive enterprise:
Coordination and realizing the fruits of coordination. What Jani-King
claimed was its business identity, "developing a cleaning system and
promoting the brand," 357 described only management and conception,
not execution. The judge remarked, "[i]f the separation of executive and
managerial functions were sufficient to take the service provided by
workers outside the course of a business," it would be easy for
companies to evade the law.358
The court likewise rejects Jani-King's attempt to define its business
359
as "building and enforcing a brand,"' without reference to the services
it marketed and sold under that brand-"the nature of the service
provided by the business."360 This disregarded that the company "holds
itself out as a leader in commercial cleaning, and contracts directly with
3 61
customers to provide commercial cleaning services."
FedEx delivery drivers also brought a class action alleging that

355. TranscriptofHearing, supra note 342, at 99. The judge referenced another case in which
workers sued a company that detailed and reconditioned cars, alleging the company had
misclassified them as independent contractors. See Rainbow Dev., LLC v. Commonwealth, No.
SUCV2005-00435, 2005 WL 3543770, at *1-4 (Mass. Super. Nov. 17, 2005) (order granting
plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings). The company claimed the workers performed
services outside its usual course of business. The hearing officer disagreed: "[t]he only 'business'
Auto Shine does is to provide its customers with the services that these employees perform." The
reviewing court agreed: "The workers are engaged in the exact business Auto Shine is engaged in;
Auto Shine merely provides the administration. []Without the services of the workers, Auto Shine
would cease to operate." Id.
356.

357.
at 2-3.
358.

Defendants'Memorandum,supra note 354, at 17.

Transcriptof Hearing, supra note 342, at 99; Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 354,
TranscriptofHearing, supra note 342, at 99.

359.

Defendants'Memorandum,supranote 354, at 3.

360.
361.

TranscriptofHearing, supranote 342, at 99.
Id.
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FedEx had misclassified them as independent contractors. 362 Again,
FedEx had to show that the drivers performed services outside the usual
course of its business. 363
FedEx claimed that its business was operating "a sophisticated
information and distribution network for the pick-up and delivery of
small packages." 36 It emphasized this distinction: Its business was not
"providing package delivery services," but "to provide for package pickup and delivery services."3 6 5 FedEx "contracted with a network of
independent owner-operators" to actually provide the services.366 The
company claimed that. its real employees were not the drivers, but
engineers, managers, and IT specialists it hired "to operate, develop,
maintain, and improve its distribution and information network."3 67
FedEx emphasized, however, "None of these employees pick-up and
deliver packages."368 In fact, "there is zero overlap between the work
regularly performed by the contractors [drivers] and that regularly
performed by [FedEx's] employees." 36 9 FedEx suggested its business
model was creating a network and giving drivers access to it.370
The judge rejected FedEx's argument:
The core of FedEx's argument is that although it
operates a 'sophisticated information and distribution
network,' it does not itself provide any delivery
362. Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 11-1 1094-RGS, 2013 WL 3353776, at
*1-2 (D. Mass. July 3, 2013), opinion withdrawn in part, 2015 WL 501512 (D. Mass. Feb. 5, 2015),
af'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded 813 F.3d 429 (1st Cir. 2016) (holding that the FAAAA
preempted the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Act, MASS. GEN. L., ch. 149, tit. 11, section

148B(a)(2)).
363. Id. at *4 (citing MASS. GEN. L., ch. 149, tit. 11, § 148B(a)(2)).
364. Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment on Liability Under the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Law at 2, Schwann v.
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 813 F.3d 429, 2013 WL 3353776 (D. Mass. July 3, 2013) (No.
1 1-cv-1 1094-RGS) [hereinafter Defendant's Opposition] (emphasis added).
365. Defendant FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.'s Response to Plaintiffs' Renewed
Statement of Undisputed Facts at 1-2, Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 813 F.3d 429,
2013 WL 3353776 (D. Mass. July 3, 2013) (No. 11-cv-l1094-RGS) [hereinafter Defendant
Response] (emphasis in original).
366. Defendant's Opposition, supranote 364, at 8.
367. See Defendant Response, supra note 365, at 2-3.
368. Defendant's Opposition, supra note 364, at 11 (emphasis in original).
369. Id. at 2 n.1, 11 (FedEx has over 40,000 employees "operating, developing and
maintaining that network, none of whom pick-up or deliver packages.").
370. Defendant Response, supra note 365 at 30; see also Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi
Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm 1-3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
6274, 1997), http://www.nber.org/papers/w6274 (defining the firm as controlling and selling access
to critical resources).
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services. To support this claim, FedEx states that out of
the 43,000 persons it deems to be employees, none pickup or deliver packages. But this argument is premised
on a tautology. FedEx cannot assert that it does not
provide delivery services by simply refusing to
recognize its delivery drivers as employees.371
The judge suggests that FedEx has not described a market division
of labor, but has rather described the separation of direction and
conception from execution, which defined a firm division of labor, while
trying to disavow responsibility for the execution.372 The judge quotes a
case in which a home furniture delivery company charged with
misclassifying its delivery drivers as independent contractors argued "it
did not provide delivery services because it only managed the delivery
of the retailers' furniture to customers, while the drivers carried out the
actual deliveries."373 There, the court rebuffed the company's attempt to
distinguish:
[T]he manag[ing] and perform[ing] functions of the
furniture delivery,[] 37 4 finding that "the managing and
performing functions of furniture delivery result in a
symbiotic relationship. Without providing physical
delivery of furniture, which is essential to its business,
37 5
[the delivery company's] business would not exist."
The court makes an idealistic and then a normative argument about
37 6
It first suggests
the relationship between the corporation and firm.
that capitalism values profit seeking through productive activity:
"Without the drivers, there would be no one to pick up or deliver
packages and FedEx's 'distribution network,' while it would likely
attract a buyer, would be of so diminished a value that the prospect of

371. Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 11-11094-RGS, 2013 WL 3353776, at
*5 (D. Mass. July 3, 2013), opinion withdrawn in part 2015 WL 501512 (D. Mass. Feb 5, 2015),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded 813 F.3d 429 (1st Cir. 2016).
372. See id. at *5-6.
373. Id. at *5 (citing Oliveira v. Advanced Delivery Sys., Inc., No. 091311, 2010 WL 4071360
(Mass. Sup. Ct. July 16, 2010)) (quoting the judge responding to a furniture delivery company
charged with misclassifying its delivery drivers as independent contractors).
374. Id.
375. Id. at *5 (citing Oliveira, 2010 WL 4071360, at *6).
376. See id. at *5-6.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

49

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3

50

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURATAL

[Vol. 34:1

shareholder approval of the sale would be next to zero." 37 7 The court
then makes a more normative statement: "Without the drivers' delivery
services to put FedEx's information and distribution network to use,
FedEx would 'cease to operate,' at least as the type of entity the public
has come to believe it to be (and which image FedEx has cultivated
through its advertising and public filings)."378 FedEx is not a true
productive enterprise without the drivers' execution to put its network
"to use"-to realize fruits of its coordination. 379 The business identity it
claims should be congruent with the persona it projects to investors and
customers. 380
The judge sensed something askew in FedEx's definition of its
"real business" as "logistics"

381

rather than delivery services:

The distinction is a creative one and requires serious
analysis, although at first glance, as the court observed
at the hearing, it is akin to the U.S. Army arguing that
its business is weapons development and logistical
planning, while it leaves the delivery of warfare to
soldiers functioning as independent contractors. 382
Within Coasian theories of the firm, what firms do and what
distinguishes them from markets is "logistics." They direct resources
instead of deferring to the play of competition and price (one might say
they even create and run networks-structured systems of nodes and
bridges-in lieu of leaving resource allocation to the unfixed channels of
markets).
Above, the courts did not look favorably upon a company that
suggested its business was to do something other than create and sell a
good or service, like "operat[ing] . . . a network" 383 or "developing" stuff
and "promoting the brand." 3 84 While the network and brand are
catchphrases of modern business, the courts suggest that these are not, in
themselves, productive activities, and therefore, could not be the basis of
a company's claim to the legitimate use of the corporate form. 385 A
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

Id. at *5.
Id. at *6 (citations omitted).
Id. at *6.
See id. at *5-6.
See id. at *4 n.5.
Id.
Id. at *5.
TranscriptofHearing, supranote 342, at 99.
Fucci v. E. Connection Operating, Inc., MICV 2008-2659, slip op. at 9 (Mass. Super. Ct.
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productive enterprise did not sit around and come up with ideas or
practice "logistics." In their vision of the firm, conceptualizing and
managing production alone, without actually carrying it out, did not
constitute a productive enterprise. It made the company a kind of "Ponzi
scheme." 386
In the janitor and FedEx cases, the courts rejected arguments that a
company could be in the business of coordinating the production of stuff
(e.g., "providingfor" delivery services), but not be in the business of that
stuff- That stuff-the fruits of the company's coordination-is what
gave it the right to use the corporate form. The court thus rejected the
asserted business identity when it did not reflect the company's product
markets, for instance, when Coverall advertised itself as a commercial
cleaning business, but claimed it was not one.m The court rebuffed
Coverall's suggestion that it was in the business of managing the
3 88
distribution of its services, but not be in the business of those services.
The court rejected FedEx's argument that it coordinated the production
of delivery services (by running a "network") but did not produce them,
and that such coordination without production could establish a
legitimate corporate entity.389 The Coasian firm is a centrally run
3 90
"information and distribution network."
These companies failed to convince the courts that they could be
productive enterprises-and thus claim legitimate use of the corporate
form-without the workers whose services generated their brand
39
recognition and value in the eyes of investors and consumers. 1 Either
the workers provided services to the companies in the course of their
usual business-because the workers were the executors-or else their
business models depended on legal arbitrage rather than the resourceful
Sept. 21, 2009) (rejecting the argument of a delivery company, which classified its drivers as
independent contractors and argued that it was not a delivery business but "only a marketing
logistics corporation which outsources transportation needs for customers"); see also Sebago v. Bos.
Cab Dispatch, Inc., 28 N.E.3d 1139, 1148 (Mass. 2015) ("This is also not a case of owners creating
a false dichotomy between the administrative and operational aspects of their business.")
"[C]ouriers deliver packages for delivery companies. There can be no dispute that they act in the
course of business for the delivery companies, even if one performs the deliveries and the other
arranges the deliveries." Id. (citations omitted).
386. Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 80, 84 (D. Mass. 2010).
387. Id. at 82-83.
388. See id.
389. See Defendant's Opposition, supra note 364, at 1-4.
390. Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 11-1 1094-RGS, 2013 WL 3353776, at
*4 (D. Mass. July 3, 2013), opinion withdrawn in part 2015 WL 501512 (D. Mass. Feb 5, 2015),
aff'd inpart, rev'd in part, remanded 813 F.3d 429 (1st Cir. 2016).
391. See id. at *5-6; see also Awuah, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 83-85.
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production and sale of innovative services to remain competitive, in this
case, misclassifying workers as independent contractors. The courts
envision the firm to be a productive enterprise, an organization engaged
in the production and sale of goods or services.392 The courts would
confer social legitimacy on a corporate entity only if its identity reflected
an underlying productive enterprise.
Contrast the companies' above with Uber. Rather than claim their
business is coordination itself, they claim to sell technology services.39 3
The idiom of technology transforms coordination into a saleable
commodity, because technology concretizes the coordination of
production. 3 94 The activity of managing production, or directing a
division of labor, re-emerges from its immersion in the Uber narrative as
the freestanding commodity of software maintenance and licensing.
This makes Uber a simulacrum of a productive enterprise even without
the drivers' services. Those who execute production, the drivers, then
re-emerge as independent businesses.
The narrative lends the
appearance of integrity to what looked in the other cases like a business
identity that would acknowledge (and thus accept the legal consequences
of) only the management appendage of a cannibalized productive
enterprise.
2. The Invisible Hand of the Algorithm
The Uber narrative invokes the automation of production through
algorithmic programming to suggest that TNCs have not displaced
market mechanisms, but rather given them free reign. 3 95 The Uber
narrative draws on discourses that present the algorithm as an
inscrutable, but inimitably rational and trans-human provider of order,
much like Hayek's "marvel of the market." 396
392. See Awuah, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 82-83.
393. See Meyer v. Kalanick, No. 15 Civ. 9796, 2016 WL 1266801, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
2016), reconsideration denied in part, No. 15 Civ. 9796, 2016 WL 2659591 (S.D.N.Y. May 9,
2016).
394. See Arzate v. Bridge Terminal Transp., Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 400, 406 (Cal. Ct. App.
2011) (Asserting one company's argument that its regular business was as a kind of intermediary,

"mak[ing] arrangements between customers and the owner-operators of trucks for the movement of

containers," and therefore its truck drivers "did not perform work that was part of [defendant's]
regular business." The court rejected the argument.

&

395. See Malte Ziewitz, Governing Algorithms Myth, Mess, and Methods, 41 SCi., TECH.,
HuM. VALUEs 3, 10-11 (2016).
396. See id. at 6-7 ("[T]he drama of the powerful yet inscrutable algorithm bears some
resemblance to long-standing mythologies, such as Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' or Charles
Darwin's 'natural selection.' Algorithms, it seems, fit in seamlessly with this line of stubbornly
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The algorithm seems to transcend human consciousness and
therefore negate human agency. In the antitrust suit against Uber's
CEO, Kalanick argues that the alleged price-fixing conspiracy was
"wildly implausible" and "physically impossible," because "it involve[d]
agreement among hundreds of thousands of independent transportation
providers all across the United States."397 The incomprehensible scale at
which the technology worked meant Uber, like the market, could not be
a product of human conspiracy. The smartphone technology interposed
itself as an autonomous but indifferent agent between Uber and the
However, the judge rejected the argument, including the
drivers. 9
appeal to the platform and algorithm's exceptionalism:
[T]he capacity to orchestrate such an agreement is the
'genius' of Mr. Kalanick and his company, which,
through the magic of smartphone technology, can invite
hundreds of thousands of drivers in far-flung locations
The advancement of
to agree to Uber's terms.
technological means for the orchestration of large-scale
price-fixing conspiracies need not leave antitrust law
behind.3 99
The insentience of the algorithm did not mean its users were
unaccountable to antitrust law. 4 0 0 The judge argued, "[t]he fact that
Uber goes to such lengths to portray itself-one might even say disguise
itself-as the mere purveyor of an 'app' cannot shield it from the
consequences of its operating as much more."401
The judge also rejects Kalanick's intimation that the application's
automated processes were the equivalent of the market's decentralized
processes: "In the instant case, Uber's digitally decentralized nature does
not prevent the App from constituting a 'marketplace' through which
Mr. Kalanick organized a horizontal conspiracy among drivers." 402 The
judge cites a prior case reminding us that, "[a]utomation is effected
through a human design., 4 03

seductive
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

stories about the origins of order.") (citation omitted).
Meyer, 2016 WL 1266801, at *5.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
See, e.g., id. at *5-6.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)).
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3. The Idiom of Technology
Uber and Lyft sublimate their agency in the production of ride
services into algorithms, programming, and technology management.
The metaphor of the "platform" transforms Uber and Lyft from subjects
into spaces. It evokes a passive space to be inhabited by active agentsdrivers and passengers.4 05 For example, Lyft argues that drivers' "low
ratings [are] given by passengers, not Lyft." 4 06 Uber argued that
passengers, and not Uber, controlled drivers' work. 407 The companies
ventriloquize a disinterested machine.
The coordination of resources by algorithm and digital signals is
relatively invisible. Recall the iconic scene from the film Modern
Times, where Charlie Chaplin is churned through the giant gears of the
factory where he worked.4 08 The "visible hand" is indeed visible here.409
Uber and Lyft, however, direct and monitor drivers' work through
ICTs-the machinery and foreman are digital. 4 10 Lyft thus ventured,
"[h]ere, there was no supervision from Lyft. Plaintiffs each attended
only one brief in-person meeting with Lyft personnel, which Cotter
himself described as 'superficial'. . . ."4 1 1 Drivers have "virtually no
contact with Lyft personnel once they were granted access to the Lyft
platform. . . ."4 12 Uber states: "Defendant's only insight into the quality
of service provided by drivers comes from passengers, in the form of
star ratings or comments."4 13 Uber claimed it "did not require drivers to
404. See Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms, in MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES: ESSAYS
ON COMMUNICATION, MATERIALITY, AND SOCIETY 167, 192 (Tarleton Gillespie et al. eds., The

MIT Press 2014) (ebook).
405. See, e.g., Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 86, at 4 (describing the "platform" as a
neutral medium); Final Order, supra note 43, at 19 ("Sometimes middlemen even provide specific
platforms for that service, such as a physical location. Everyday examples include flea markets, art
galleries, street fairs, food truck festivals, and gun shows.... Technological advances like the
Internet and smartphones have provided new platforms for middlemen.").
406. Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 86, at 7.

407. Transcript,supra note 92, at 67-68.
408. See MODERN TIMES (Charles Chaplin Productions 1936).
409. CHANDLER, supra note 124, at 12 (arguing that the visible hand of the business enterprise
replaced the "invisible hand" of the market when the former could coordinate productive tasks more
efficiently); Don Matthews, The Visible Hand? The Economics ofAlfred Chandler, 18 Econ. & Bus.
Hist. Soc'y 163, 163 (2000) ("[T]he theme of the Visible Hand is that 'modem business enterprise
took the place of market mechanisms in coordinating the activities of the economy and allocating its
resources. In many sectors of the economy the visible hand of management replaced what Adam
Smith referred to as the invisible hand of market forces."').
410. See infra notes 411-22 and accompanying text.
411. Summary Judgment Motion, supranote 86, at 16.
412. Id. at 2.
413. Notice ofMotion, supra note 87, at 4 n.6.
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,414

Drivers worked "without
report to anyone on a regular basis."
4 15
with "minimal" interaction with Uber.4 16 Customersupervision,"
delegated monitoring and digital commands relayed over distances by an
algorithm are less obvious than more material indicators of
organizational boundaries and coordination-like working in a "brick
4 17
The Uber
and mortar" restaurant under the eye of a manager.
"network" claims to be but a resume of the market's diffuse sorting
processes.
Uber and Lyft also translate agency costs they incur in monitoring,
directing, and disciplining workers into the idiom of technology
production.4 18 Activities that look much like traditional employer
control in other cases here look like the management of technology, not
labor. According to Lyft, it does not direct and supervise drivers-it
monitors drivers' compliance with a user license and "maintain[s] an on4 20
The
line platform."41 9 Lyft prevents interference with software.
components of employee evaluations-"passenger rating, acceptance
rate and reliability rating"-become "metrics" or "tools for ensuring that
drivers and riders have the best experience possible and limit instances
where individuals improperly interfere with the efficient functioning of
421
Uber
the Lyft platform in violation of the [Terms of Service]."
ensure
to
discipline
and
warnings
employee
of
its
use
rationalized
drivers accepted ride assignments in terms of its need to ensure a
seamless market.422
4 23
The judge in O'Connor fortunately resisted this interpretation.
Quoting Foucault, he suggests that power in work relations can be

414. Id. at 21.
415. Id. at 24.
416. Id. at 2.
417. See Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 172, at 8-14 (discussing management by algorithm).
418. See infra Part V.A.3.
419.

See Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 86, at 1.

420. Id. at 7.
421. Id. at 7 (contending it disciplined drivers to prevent them from "interfering or disrupting
the ridesharing services"). Homejoy, a company that developed a software application to sell ondemand house cleaning also depicted itself as a market mediator. Christina Farr, Homejoy at the
Unicorn Glue Factory: Will the Home-Cleaning Revolution Be Uberfied? How One Company Tried
and Spectacularly Failed, BACKCHANNEL (Oct. 26, 2015), https://medium.com/backchannel/why-

homejoy-failed-bb0ab39d9Ola?imm mid=Odbb46&cmp=em-na-na-naIt referred to the practice of firing cleaners as
newsltrecon_20151106#.w3szqanu7.
"disintermediation." Id.
422. Notice ofMotion, supra note 87, at 4 ("The more drivers who decline a request, the longer
the passenger waits .... "). Uber "reserve[d] the right to deactivate the accounts of drivers who
[fell] below [Uber's] quality standards." Id.
423. See O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1151-52 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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automated and depersonalized, and further, that ICTs can amplify this
power:
Uber drivers . . are monitored by Uber customers (for
Uber's benefit, as Uber uses the customer rankings to
make decisions regarding which drivers to fire) during
each and every ride they give, and Uber's application
data can similarly be used to constantly monitor certain
aspects of a driver's behavior. This level of monitoring,
where drivers are potentially observable at all times,
arguably gives Uber a tremendous amount of control
over the 'manner and means' of its drivers'
performance.424
B. ConceptualizingService Work and Spatially Dispersed Work
The appeal of the Uber narrative may also be an artifact of the
under-theorization of service work within a stubborn and overbearing
industrial paradigm that governs how we think about labor and the
economy.425
Uber and Lyft's production of ride services is also less visible
because the companies are coordinating spatially dispersed service work.
This makes Uber's claim to be a market-mediator more convincing. The
simultaneity of production and individualized consumption in most
service work involving customer interaction obscures the collective
nature of production, and thus, the company's centralized coordination.
Take the example of a restaurant with table service. The restaurant
coordinates a division of labor in time and space when organizing table
service. It tries to allocate waiters and other staff so that every table
receives timely and non-redundant service. The division of labor and its
relationship to consumption in the restaurant appears different than that
of a manufacturing facility, where many workers may cooperate to make
a single automobile, and the automobile is clearly a collective product.
While each table consumes the restaurant's service individually, the
orderly servicing of many restaurant patrons is also the outcome of
collective production. Uber likewise coordinates a complex division of
labor in space and time in the production of ride services, as described in
424. Id. at 1151-52 (citation omitted).
425. Workers outside the brick-and-mortar workplace, particularly in the transportation sector,
have long been the subjects of legal disputes over employment classification, with judges frequently
ruling that they are independent contractors. See Dubal, supra note 33, at 23.
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Part III.B. The cooperative nature of production is more difficult to see
when workers are not assembled in a single workplace and a customer
receives service from one worker at a time. The drivers' productionthe collective output of many rides across a geographic expanse and
through time-takes on the guise of individualized output by each
driver.
The illusion that the service is the product of an individual worker
also tends to create the appearance that the worker provides most of the
means of production. Thus, the Uber narrative acquires a patina of
plausibility because the drivers own or lease the cars.426 According to
the narrative, the Uber ride is not cooperatively produced, and from an
individual customer's perspective, this might seem like a viable claim.
In reality Uber supplies the most valuable instruments of production, the
technology. 427 The legerdemain is more obvious in the case of a
restaurant. Take the example of a hostess at a fine dining restaurant who
must wear cocktail attire to greet and seat guests. We could say she
owns all the means of production. If what she produces is hospitality,
then she owns all of the means of production-her fancy attire. Most
would say, however, that her job is to produce dining services, a
cooperative effort, and thus she owns little of the means of production.
The on-demand structure of the service also mystifies Uber's
operations. What Uber characterizes as facilitating a "match" between
supply and demand in product markets is at the same time making a
match in the labor market. 4 2 8 Drivers in the labor market report their
availability to work by logging into the application, and Uber responds
to customer demand for rides in the product market by assigning drivers
to passengers. 4 2 9 Likewise, a restaurant sets a host and wait-staff into
motion when customers enter, an uptick in demand for dining services.
Most would not accept that the restaurant is facilitating a market
"match" between sellers of hospitality services (host and wait-staff) and
buyers (diners), or that the waiters are independent businesses
responding to the restaurant's provision of market information about

426.
427.

See Hart, supra note 129, at 1765.
See Notice of Motion, supra note 87, at 26; Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 86, at

428.

See Noah D. Zatz, Does Work Law Have a Future If the Labor Market Does Not?, 91

1.
CI.-KENT L. REV. 1088-90 (2016) (also discussing the possibility of a future where legal
regulation does not attempt to distinguish between labor and product markets, or labor and other
fields of activity).
429. See supra Part II.B.; see also O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1149
(N.D. Cal. 2015); Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 86, at 4; Notice of Motion, supra note 87,
at 4

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

57

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3
58

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENTLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 34:1

dining demand. In the Uber and Lyft relationships, drivers respond to
the prospect of work and earnings, and Uber responds to passenger
demand by supervising and directing drivers reporting for work. 43 0 The
price mechanism is not coordinating resources in production; it is,
however, mobilizing labor supply. However, "factor" and "product"
markets overlap far more in on-demand services like Uber than they do
in the restaurant example.43 1 It is more difficult to distinguish the
mobilization of labor from the mobilization of production to meet
demand.
During surge pricing, the mobilization can be simultaneous.
Consider Uber and the judge's disagreement in O'Connor about the
432
interpretation of surge pricing.
During surge pricing, Uber
temporarily raises fares in an area based on an increase or projected
increase in demand.433 According to Uber, the point is to attract drivers
to busy areas (i.e., to incentivize drivers to join the market as
transportation seller). Uber thus interprets surge pricing as consistent
with the price mechanism-Uber is just relaying information about
increased demand to drivers to encourage supply in the product
market.434 The judge rejected this interpretation, replying, "every
producer is subject to the laws of supply and demand,"4 35 viewing
Uber's surge pricing as bargaining in labor or input markets in response
to an increase in demand, not in markets for the sale of commodities.
C. FaultLines in CoasianFirm Theory
1.Assumptions about Legal Relations
The narrative also appears plausible because it draws on
assumptions, perhaps ambiguities, in Coasian theories of the firm about
legal relations. When ICTs disrupted these assumptions, Coasian theory
became somewhat vulnerable to a postindustrial reinterpretation of the
firm.
Like the tendency to equate corporate identity with the firm, there is
430. See supra Part I.B.; see also O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149; Summary Judgment
Motion, supra note 86, at 4; Notice ofMotion, supra note 87, at 4.

431. See Cheung, supra note 130, at 3 (noting factor and product markets are not always
distinguishable).
432. Transcript,supra note 92, at 31-35.
433. See id. at 34.
434. See id. ("When Uber raises rates based on its projectedincrease in passenger demand, it is
clearly not simply relaying information from demanders to suppliers.").
435. Id.
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also a tendency to equate property rights with the firm, and contracts
with markets. Since Uber does not own or lease the cars outright, we
might be inclined to assume that Uber must be vertically de-integrated.
On the one hand, this is an impoverished reading of Coasian theory.
Coase and Williamson did not reduce their definition of the firm as the
coordination of resources via property rights and definition of the market
as coordination through formal contract.436 They conceptualized the
firm, and distinguished it from the market, as the centralized
coordination of resources, or the appropriation of the market processes
of competition and price. At the same time, however, their work has
been somewhat ambiguous about the institutional components of
centralized and price coordination, particularly the role of legal
relations.437
Several theorists, Coase and Williamson included, assumed that the
centralized coordination of resources that constituted the firm would be
accomplished through property rights and employment, 43 8 and that the
436. See Coase, Nature, supra note 4, at 389 ("It can, I think, be assumed that the
distinguishing mark of the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism."). Oliver Hart comes
closest to defining the firm as property ownership. He also, however, theorizes property as a means
of centralized coordination-property ownership is important because it gives an owner "residual"
control. Hart, supra note 129, at 1765.
437. E.g., Williamson, Outsourcing, supra note 110, at 8-9 (defining the firm as both a
"hierarchy" and "syndrome" of attributes that includes "unified ownership of successive stages" of
production). See Rajan & Zingales, supra note 131, at 39 (critiquing their interpretation of the
Coasian firm as a "legal definition" based on property ownership).
438. Major Coasian theories, however, have suggested that employment is less a formal
relation and means by which centralized coordination is carried out, and more the absence of a
formal relation and constitutive of centralized coordination: The firm is the alternative to contract,

and the firm is employment. Coase and Williamson have depicted the firm as an absence of legal
limits on one party's ongoing discretion, the essence of employment. Coase, Nature, supra note 4,

at 391-92, 403 ("We can best approach the question of what constitutes a firm in practice by
considering the legal relationship normally called that of 'master and servant' or 'employer and
Given the contractual requirements of consideration and definiteness, Coase
employee."').
describes employment and the firm as a virtual anti-contract; he also suggests that it is difficult to
exchange labor through contract-outside a firm:
The details of what the supplier is expected to do is not stated in the contract
but is decided later by the purchaser. When the direction of resources (within
the limits of the contract) becomes dependent on the buyer in this way, that

relationship which I term a 'firm' may be obtained.... It is obviously of
more importance in the case of services-labour-than it is in the case of ...
commodities. In the case of commodities, the main items can be stated in
advance and the details which will be decided later will be of minor
significance.
Id. at 392; see also Oliver E. Williamson, The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From

Choice to Contract, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 171, 178 (2002) ("In effect, the contract law of internal
organization is that of forbearance, according to which a firm becomes its own court of ultimate
appeal. Firms for this reason are able to exercise fiat that the markets cannot."). From the
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contract would be an unsuitable means. 43 9 This notion that property
ownership was needed for firm coordination was based on some
perceived limits of contract, as a legal template for ordering certain
transactions. Some transactions posed certain coordination challenges
and hazards that the contract could not resolve, or could not resolve as
cheaply as centralized direction. 44 0 Theorists suggested, for instance,
that firm coordination was often cheaper than market coordination when
transactions were complex, involved ongoing cooperation among several
parties, and were hard to specify upfront." t Contract was designed for
bilateral relations, making it rather unsuitable for ordering multilateral
relations.44 2 Also, contracts required parties to specify important terms
upfront, not make them up as they went along.443 Contracts allow each
party only limited authority over labor services and non-labor inputs.
Thus, contracts seemed unsuited to handle the contingencies that tended
to arise in complex transactions requiring the ongoing cooperation of
parties. 4 44 They do not allow one party to control how the other party
performs its contractual obligations, thus limiting its use as a tool for
carrying out centralized coordination. The strictures of the contract
could also leave a party's transaction-specific investments, or
investments that would be less valuable outside the relationship and
difficult to redeploy to other uses, too vulnerable to the other party's
opportunistic behavior."

5

Property rights and formal employment seemed more suited for

perspective of contract doctrine, an employer's right of control is not a contractual right, but merely
an observation that the employer, as the party with greater bargaining power, will likely get the
other party to obey it. Julia Tomassetti, From Hierarchiesto Markets: FedEx Drivers and the Work
Contract as Institutional Marker, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1083, 1147 (2015) [hereinafter

&

Tomassetti, From Hierarchiesto Markets]. Alchian's and Demsetz's prominent disagreement with
Coase over the role of fiat in firm production implicitly recognizes this difference. Alchian
Demsetz, supra note 143, at 777.

439. See Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics, supra note 124, at 236-37; see Hart, supra
note 129, at 1765; Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration,
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 302-03
(1978).
440. Williamson, Outsourcing, supra note 110, at 8-9 (arguing that market coordination, via
contract, was "well suited to implement autonomous adaptations but poorly suited to effect
cooperative adaptations").

441.

See id.

442.
443.

See Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics, supra note 124, at 237.
See Coase, Nature, supra note 4, 391-92.

444.
445.

See id.; Transaction-CostEconomics, supra note 124, at 237.
See Williamson, Outsourcing, supra note 110, at 10; Williamson, Transaction-Cost

Economics, supra note 124, at 241-42 (noting contract law does not prevent opportunistic behavior
between contracting parties).
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carrying out centralized coordination, or constituting the firm.

In

comparison to the contract, property rights and formal employment
6
provide relatively plenary and open-ended authority over resources,4
which often made firm coordination cheaper than market coordination
when dealing with complex transactions. Using property rights to direct
production relieved one of worrying about the inability to predict
contingencies or adjust relationships: Property rights gave the owner
"residual" control over whatever is not specified in agreements with
*447

other parties to the transaction.

2. Critiques of the Assumptions
Many critiques of Coasian theory appear to derive from
dissatisfaction with its assumptions about the institutional makeup of
firms and markets, and the limited kinds of relationships this
authorizes." 8 Given their composition of property and, employment,
Coasian theories tended to conceptualize firm coordination as
9
They tended
multilateral, open-ended, hierarchical and often indirect."
to understand market relationships formed through contracts as bilateral,
4 50
The association of firms and markets with
discrete, equal, and direct.
features and legal templates has struck
relational
of
these syndromes
many as too limiting.
Commercial arrangements seemed to defy Coasian taxonomies of
firms and markets. Collaboration among entities in the biotech sector
might be multilateral and somewhat ongoing, but not hierarchical or
open-ended.4 51 Many contractual relations do not look like the market
relations of classic firm theory-discrete, arms-length exchanges.
"Relational contracts" between suppliers and customers may be long-

446. Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics, supra note 124, at 237;
Nature, supra note 4, at 391-92.

see also Coase,

447. Hart, supranote 129, at 1765.
448. Scholars have suggested that legal templates sometimes limit the ability of coordinating
productive activity in new ways. E.g., Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:Adjustment of Long-Term
Economic. Relations under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L.

REV. 854, 883 (1978) (suggesting courts should recognize longer term, more flexible relationships
as enforceable "relational" contracts). Others have shown that commercial actors may construct and

conduct business relations with little regard to the legal relations they might be creating.

E.g.,

Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM. Soc. REV.

55, 55-58 (1963).
449. Tomassetti, From Hierarchiesto Markets, supra note 438, at 1128.

450. Id.
451. E.g., Walter W. Powell, et al., Network Dynamics and Field Evolution: The Growth of
InterorganizationalCollaborationin the Life Sciences, 110 AM. J. OF SOC. 1132, 1132 (2005).
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term, but bilateral and somewhat equal. Scholars have suggested that
contract law has been changing, for better and worse, to accommodate
parties in creating more open-ended and flexible relations through
contract.4 52 On the other hand, companies today often insert extremely
detailed, explicit standards and sanctions into contracts, creating an
ongoing, hierarchical organization-a firm-like organization-with
other entities.4 53 Relations that resemble a firm in their substantive
features-ongoing, multilateral, and hierarchical-are often construed
through contract, rather than property and employment.454 For instance,
the business relations between buyers and sellers in buyer-driven supply
chains are often hierarchical and ongoing.
Further, several scholars have critiqued Coasian theories of the firm
for under-theorizing non-market, multilateral coordination that is not
accomplished through hierarchy and. centralized property rights.455
"Collaborative-community"
firms
are
multilateral,
long-term
associations, like firms, but not hierarchical.45 6
Scholars have examined the role of a variety of different
institutional means for creating and sustaining governance structures,
including: reputation, norms, intellectual property rights, and innovative
contractual provisions.4 57 Williamson, in a more recent article, attributes
the sometimes effectiveness of "credible contracting," which he
describes as a hybrid governance structure, to a non-legal institutional
means-reputation.458 And, social institutions less defined by legal
template or commercial practice, like professionalization, also
coordinate resources in production through different means than those
envisioned by Coasian firm theory.459
452.

See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS,

AND THE RULE OF LAW 150-53 (Princeton Univ. Press, 2013) (discussing changes in contract law
increasing the authority of the more powerful party); see also Macneil, supra note 448, at 879-80
(discussing the UCC's accommodation of longer term and less discrete business relations).
453. See WEIL, supra note 26, at 71.
454. See Tomassetti, From Hierarchiesto Markets, supra note 438, at 1094.
455. See, e.g., Gorga & Halberstram, supra note 158, at 10-14, 23-24 (discussing different
scholar's opinions in contrast with Coase's theory of the firm).
456. See Adler & Heckscher, supranote 159, at 20-21.
457. E.g., Robert Gibbons, Firms (and Other Relationships),in THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY
FIRM 187 (promise and reputation); Rajan & Zingales, supra note 131, at 7 (control over access to
resources); see also Brian Uzzi, The Sources and ConsequencesofEmbeddednessfor the Economic

Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect, 61 AM. Soc. REv. 674, 675, 693 (1996);
Powell, supra note 451, at 1140-48.
458. Williamson, Outsourcing, supra note 110, at 10.
459. E.g., Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Bureaucraticand Craft Administration in Production, in

THE SOCIOLOGY OF ECONOMIC LIFE 347-48, 355-56 (Mark Granovetter & Richard Swedberg eds.,
3d ed., Westview Press 1992).
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3.Disturbing the Assumptions with ICTs
ICTs have disturbed assumptions that property rights are the basis
of firm production (to coordinate resources through non-market,
centralized processes) and that contracts are unsuitable for firm
production.4 60
ICTs can make firm production cheaper than market production by
increasing the central coordinator's power to direct and monitor the
activity of others (labor and other inputs to production) while lowering
461 The technology can facilitate a
the costs of direction and monitoring.
Barcode, GPS, and
higher-resolution, more penetrating control.
monitor the location
to
FedEx
scanning technology make it possible for
and time of every package pickup or delivery a driver makes.
McDonald's uses scheduling software that monitors the ratio of sales
volume to staff in almost real time, enabling it to control the schedules
of workers who are not official McDonald's employees, but the
463 Weil observes that the greater
employees of McDonald's franchisees.
the lead company's power to direct other entities, the less resources it
464
needs to expend on supervision.
Second, ICTs can lower the costs of firm production by enabling
465
companies to exercise "residual" control even without property rights.
Technology has enabled companies to allocate and direct resources
across formal business boundaries, or to act like a firm without acquiring
46 6 Weil notes that when lead
and exercising formal property rights.
companies "fissured," or transferred responsibility for certain activities
to formally separate entities, the lead companies were generally
467
They
unwilling to relinquish control over the extruded activities.
challenges
principal-agent
manage
to
developed several mechanisms

460. See Coase, Nature, supranote 4, at 397.
461. See id at 392. Coase further surmised that communication technologies (the telegraph
and telephone) might increase firm size, because "they reduce[d] the cost of organising [sic]
spatially." Id. at 397.
462. Tomassetti, From Hierarchiesto Markets, supra note 438, at 1120, 1136.
BNA DAILY
463. See John Herzfeld, Sides Clash at McDonald's Joint Employer Hearing,
447
9
/; see, e.g.,
LAB. REP. (Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.bna.com/sides-clash-mcdonalds-n57 82068
David J. Kaufmann et al., A Franchisoris Not the Employer oflts Franchiseesor Their Employees,
34 FRANCIuSE L.J. 439, 449-50 (2015) (discussing the control franchisors have over franchisees and
the way they operate their business).
464.

See WEIL, supra note 26, at 189.

465.
466.
467.

See Hart, supranote 129, at 1766 n.35.
See WEIL, supranote 26, at 62.
Id. at 63-64.
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across formal business boundaries.46 8 One mechanism is the use of
ICTs. ICTs have improved the capabilities of lead companies not only
to gather information for selection processes, but also to monitor
formally separate entities, and to coordinate and direct multiple other
entities. 46 9 Shippers gained control over so-called independent truck
drivers through onboard computing.47 0
Uber is a great illustration of how ICTs can make firm production
cheaper than market production by lowering the transaction costs of
centralized coordination. 4 7 1 Technology (and Uber's bargaining power)
settled the "make or buy" calculus in favor of a "make" decision. First,
Uber's smartphone technology lowered the costs of firm production by
reducing the agency costs of directing, monitoring, and correcting
drivers. The technology (in tandem with Uber's bargaining power)
helps Uber direct production inputs-cars-across formal business
boundaries. Uber does not have to assume the usual firm transaction
costs of property rights over the cars to exercise a property-like control
over them; it can instead use its bargaining power and the coordination
capabilities of technology.472
ICTs can place companies in a win-win situation, where they avoid
the trade-off between adaptability and control theorized in major
economic theories of the firm. By controlling resources without owning
them, companies can keep as few assets and employees as possible to
better adapt to downturns in the market and meet fast-shifting demands
for different products and services. Walmart exerts momentous control
over its suppliers.473 It achieves this control through bargaining power
and ICTs, however, and not through formal property rights over the
equity or assets of suppliers. 474 While eschewing property rights over
inputs-Walmart does not have to relinquish control to the market and
assume arms-length relationships with other entities.
By improving information, coordination, and automation
capabilities, ICTs also increase predictive capabilities. To the extent
ICTs enable the central coordinator to better specify transactions upfront
(or at least simulate the appearance of ex ante specification), ICTs may
468. Id. at 61-64.
469. Id.
470. Id. at 61-62.
471. This was one of Coase's predictions. See Coase, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
Uber is one example of affirming evidence.
472.

See Rogers, Social Cost, supra note 193, at 89-90. Uber's vertical integration and market

share should also enable more efficient compliance with regulations. Id. at 90.
473. See WEIL, supra note 26, at 163, 167.
474. See id. at 163-64.
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render a more suitable legal mechanism of centralized coordination,
47 5
The agreements
including for complex and ongoing transactions.
between McDonald's and its franchisees set out in extreme detail pricing
to customers, technical methods, and quality standards; for instance, how
many seconds it should take to place an order, how many seconds it
should take to create the order.476 By obliging parties to use and follow
certain ICTs that remain under the control of the lead company,
however, the contract need not in practice limit the lead company's
discretion to deprive the other party of the benefit of the deal.
VI.

IMPLICATIONS

A. Liberated Capitaland the Law
We should be troubled by the Uber narrative's impersonation of
Coasian theory. By prescribing a normative relationship between the
firm and corporation-by requiring that corporate identity bear more
than an attenuated relation to the organization of productive activityCoasian theories subjected the corporate form to some social discipline.
In trying to free the corporation from the firm, its mortal coil of
productive activity, the Uber narrative tends to release capital from
social accountability. In Karl Polanyi's terms, it works to "disembed"
the economic from the social.477
The Uber narrative has not only permeated journalistic and
academic accounts of Uber. Its credibility has manifested as a legal
issue in several disputes involving Uber in multiple fields of
regulation.478
The lack of intelligibility of the Uber narrative within Coasian
theory urges us to be more careful in distinguishing between innovative
ways of organizing productive activity and arrangements that represent
profit-seeking through other means, like speculative activity and legal
arbitrage. The success of the Uber narrative would confirm Marx's
prediction that "the form of monopoly, craft, guild, corporation, etc.," is
475. See id. at 126.
476. See Sarah Fister Gale, McDonald's USA: A Golden Arch of Supply Chain Food
Safety, FOOD SAFETY MAGAZINE (Feb./Mar. 2006), http://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/magazinearchivel/februarymarch-2006/mcdonalds-usa-a-golden-arch-of-supply-chain-food-safety/

(explaining the rigorous quality and safety guidelines McDonald's forces their franchisees to
follow).
477. See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME, 60-61 (Beacon Press, 2001) (1944).

478.

See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 63, at 40-41.
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capital that "has not yet reached the stage of indifference to its content,
of complete being-for-self, i.e., of abstraction from all other being, and
hence has not yet become liberated capital." 4 79
The problem is not limited to employment law or to companies that
use ICTs to coordinate the provision of goods and services. Levitin
identifies a parallel form of arbitrage in the securities context. 4 80 He
shows that companies responsible for several major financial scandals
and episodes of systemic destabilization issued the exotic securities at
the root of the turmoil through Special Purpose Entities ("SPEs"). 4 81
The lead companies did not own the SPEs, but rather controlled them
through detailed contracts.482
The companies disavowed their
responsibility for the SPEs, and the law failed to hold them responsible,
since they did not hold equity control over the SPEs.483 As in the case of
decision makers who accept the Uber narrative, and here as well, the law
failed to recognize the party with substantive control as the legally
accountable actor, because it exercised this control through contract
rather than property.484
If we want to achieve policy traction, whether in employment, tax,
securities, or other fields, we should reject a reductionist understanding
that reduces the meaning of firms, markets, or networks to formal
relations amenable to manipulation and arbitrage, like the distinction
between debt and equity, 485 or employment and independent
contracting. 486 We need to stop conflating the productive enterprise with
its business form.487 We can no longer treat the firm and corporation as
metonyms.
B. The Exceptionalism ofICTs and Work Law
The Uber narrative appeals to the ineffable exceptionalism of new
479.

MARX, supra note'283, at 37.

480. Bratton & Levitin, supra note 24, at 793.
481. Id. at 787-93.
482. See id.
483. See id.
484. Id. at 794.
485. See Riles, supranote 45, at 68-69.
486. Authors Bratton & Levitin, have looked to accounting principles to develop a "functional"
theory of the firm that does not define firm boundaries by equity ownership. Bratton & Levitin,
supra note 24, at 788, 794.
487. See Timothy P. Glynn, Taking the Employer Out ofEmployment Law? Accountabilityfor
Wage and Hour Violations in an Age ofEnterpriseDisaggregation, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J.

201, 209-212 (2011) (equating the disaggregation of companies into separate proprietary entities
with disaggregation of the Coasian firm).
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technology. Like a talisman, Uber and Lyft would have ICTs transform
everything they touch into a different substrate of reality. During oral
argument in Cotter, the judge chastised Lyft's attorney for failing to cite
California cases involving the employee status of drivers who could
decline assignments, and, like Lyft drivers, could decide if and when
they wanted to work.488 The attorney's response was that these were
cases "predating the internet,"4 89 or "traditional" cases; now we are
4 90
He was likewise unable to
dealing with "different technologies."
offer a distinction between Lyft and someone who hires day laborers
491
from a corner.
The sophistic appeal of the Uber narrative suggests that we need to
interrogate the coherence of the "platform economy" as an empirical
phenomenon relevant to policy making. Terms often reserved for
492
platform work, like the "peer-to-peer economy" and the "human-tohuman economy" 493 would seem to describe almost all service work
involving customer interaction.494 For instance, hair salons match
"intermediate markets" between buyers of haircuts and sellers (salon
staff), and cafes match diners to sellers of hospitality services (waiters).
Gig economy companies tend to be in industries where contests
495
over employment status have been common for over half a century.
These include delivery services, transportation, and commercial and
domestic cleaning. Much of the work in these industries has changed
little over the decades. We still clean floors with mops and brooms, and
deliver hardcopy newspapers by foot or a form of transport with wheels.
If it is the flexible scheduling that makes Uber and other platform
companies "different," we need to be clear about this and provide a
convincing rationale for why this should warrant a new regulatory
488. Transcript of Official Electronic Sound Recording of proceedings at 17, 19-22, Cotter v.
Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 13-cv--04065-VC) (discussing JKH
Enterprises, Inc. v. Dep't of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) and Air
Couriers Int'l v. Emp't Dev. Dep't, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)).
489. Id. at 19.
490. Id. at 18.
491. Id.at42-46.
2013),
9,
(Mar.
ECONOMIST
of the Sharing Economy,
492. The Rise
2
1573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharing-economy.
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/
493.

Tom Lowery, Human to Human (H2H) -

Collaboration is the New Competition,

HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 2014, 1:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-lowery/humanto-humancollaborati b_4696790.html.
494. See Lobel, supra note 63, at 15 (comparing the platform economy to the preindustrial
economy because both involve "direct individual-to-individual monetized exchanges").
495. But see Katz, supra note 102, at 1098 (noting that while many platform companies
"provide an old service through a new channel," some provide new offerings, like auctions for
parking spaces).
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category.496 If is the fact that many platform workers use personal
resources to create goods or services, then we likewise need to articulate
a better rationale for why this makes platform companies
"intermediaries" rather than employers that have transferred certain costs
of production to their employees (something that is often illegal).
Uber and Lyft took legal positions in O'Connorand Cotter that are
exceptional for employment status disputes.
The disputes are
noteworthy for shifting the discursive frontier of the argument in
disputes over employment misclassification. Companies rarely contest
that the putative independent contractors are selling them some service.
Both employees and independent contractors perform services for a
client. The distinction lies in the conditions under which they perform
the services, namely the extent to which the alleged employer has a right
to control the manner of service provision.497 Most employment status
disputes are waged over the control issue. Rarely does the threshold
question become an issue. This is true of other California disputes
involving taxi and delivery drivers, and of cases in which the workers,
like Uber drivers, can choose whether and when to work.49 8 One
California case involved airport couriers working in the 1980s and 1990s
(before smartphone technology). 4 99 According to the company, couriers
could choose when and whether to work, and could decline dispatches
without risking discipline or termination.50 0 The company contested its
right to control the drivers, but not that the drivers performed services
for it, nor did it contest that the drivers' work was integral to its

496. See Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 1511, 1535-37 (2016).
497.

Glynn, supra note 487, at 209; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW

§

1.01, at

14 (Proposed Final Draft 2014) (suggesting there is little difference in practice between the right-tocontrol test and another test based on "economic realities").

498. E.g., Ali v. U.S.A. Cab Ltd., 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 568, 579-80 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). But see
Yellow Cab Coop., Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 277 Cal. Rptr. 434, 436-37 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (rejecting the taxi company's claim that drivers did not provide it any service, noting "[t]he
drivers, as active instruments of that enterprise, provide an indispensable 'service' to [the taxi
company]"). In a Massachusetts employment status dispute involving taxi drivers, the court found
that the alleged employer, a taxi association, provided services to the drivers, rather than the other
way around. Kubinec v. Top Cab Dispatch, Inc., No. SUCV201203082BLSI, 2014 WL 3817016,
at *10 (Mass. Super. June 25, 2014). It also agreed with the company that it was in a different line
of business than the drivers, the "business of radio dispatch and communication services for
passengers for hire." Id. at 12. However, the court based its reasoning in large part on the fact that
the taxi association received a flat fee from drivers each week, not a share of revenue from each
ride. Id.
499. See Air Couriers Int'l v. Emp't Dev. Dep't, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37, 40 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
500. Id. at 38.
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business. 50 1 In the Uber class action, however, while the judge
ultimately rejected the argument, the threshold question of service
provision consumes almost all of the oral argument.50 2
C. Entrepreneurialism?
We also need to interrogate the notion of entrepreneurialism
implied in the Uber narrative. To what extent does it redefine servitude
as autonomy and relatively unskilled work as entrepreneurialism?
The transaction-cost narrative resembles human capital theory.
Human capital theory proposed that jobs reflected the available
technology and efficient allocation of inputs to production.503 The labor
market assortment process was that of finding the right "fit" between a
job and worker. Generally, the relationship between the origin of jobs
and the labor market sorting process has been the obverse: Labor market
sorting begins with the employer's organization of production that
creates the "jobs."5 " Human capital theory treats the existence of jobs
as market outcomes that are exogenous to the employment
relationship. 0 5

The Uber narrative goes one step further in appealing to the market
as a mechanism for sorting and matching pre-constituted entities; it
proposes that Uber does not design and fill jobs, but "matches"
businesses with customers. 0 6 Consider this comment by a management
professor who lumps Uber in an omnium gatherum of companies,
including Airbnb: "Those matches have always existed, but it was just
too expensive to find them.... But by having a digital platform, the
The
costs get much lower so you get more of those matches."o
a
business
narrative interpellates everyone with a car in the driveway as
entity, an independent "transportation provider"5 08 that the market has
constituted prior to any encounter with Uber. Consider also this
501. See Opening Brief for Air Couriers International at *3-13, Air Couriers Int'l v. Emp't
Dev. Dep't, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (No. C050978). The court upheld the lower
court's finding that the couriers were employees. See Air Couriers,59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 46-47.
502. See Transcript, supra note 92 (while the judge summarily rejected the company's
argument in his decision, much of the oral argument was devoted to arguing this question).

503. See Chris Tilly & Charles Tilly, Capitalist Work and Labor Markets, in THE HANDBOOK
OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 286-87 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., Princeton Univ. Press
1994).
504. Id.
505. Id. at 287.
506.

See Bruner, supra note 1.

507.
508.

Id. (emphasis added).
See Notice ofMotion, supra note 87, at 3.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

69

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3

70

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 34:1

exchange between the professor from above and an interviewer:

*

Question: Perhaps you were an employee of a car
service and now you're a self-employed entrepreneur
who markets your driving services through Uber. So
far, does the evidence suggest that labor is doing better
or worse under the new system?
Answer: Ultimately, what employees will make is less a
function of the system per se and more a matter of the
market's overall demand for that set of skills. 5
Taylors' defense of the "specialist" manual laborer replacing the
skilled artisan has a more palatable veneer in the "platform economy" of
"entrepreneurs." 5 10

According to Uber, all of its unilateral actions,

including lowering fares, "benefit" the drivers;511 they protect the
platform, the ecology of a shared economic habitat. As in Talcott
Parsons' translation of Max .Weber: Herrshaft, domination, becomes
"imperative coordination." 512
The fact that drivers put personal resources in addition to their
energies at the boss' disposal does not make them into independent
businesses. Uber gets control of the car, but need not purchase it
outright, pay for its maintenance, or account to its owner for the return
on this asset or its depreciation.5 13 The car becomes capital to Uber.
Uber and Lyft designed a productive process in which execution of the
work has been reduced primarily to the application of labor effort, work
that requires no special assets and little in the way of experience or
expertise.514
509.

Bruner, supra note 1.

510. See id.
511.

See Marc Santora & John Surico, Uber Drivers in New York City ProtestFare Cuts, N.Y.

TIMES (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/02/nyregion/uber-drivers-in-new-york-cityprotest-fare-cuts.html.
512. See MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 324 (A. M.

Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., Talcott Parsons ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1947).
513. See Frazier, supranote 74, at 1.
514. See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the
Modern Economy, 96 B. U. L. REv. 1673, 1684-85 (2016). Moreover, the narrative is likely Janusfaced. Uber and Lyft may appear more valuable to investors by showing that the drivers are a large
pool of unskilled workers-not independent entrepreneurs. See Irani, supra note 275, at 226-27.
Discussing companies that hire workers through Amazon's Mechanical Turk to complete digital
tasks, Irani argues:
The agency of workers ...
threatens the valuation of microwork-based
'software' companies in two primary ways. First, the more visible the
workers in human computation become, the less the 'software' companies
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In the ideological gloaming of this story, workers may vanish. The
physiological individual is becoming an independent business, an
"entrepreneur of the self,""' by virtue of being resourceful in the
management of metabolic, affective, cognitive, and other unalienable
capacities. The rationalization of one's labor in order to live is
becoming "entrepreneurial."
D. Business Identity and Employment Classification
The Coasian analysis of the Uber narrative has more concrete
implications for employment status disputes. Virtually all of the legal
tests for employment status ask the alleged employer for some account
of its business identity-what the company is about and how it does
it.516

As illustrated in O'Connorand Cotter-the disputes over janitorial
services and the FedEx lawsuit-the issue of business identity forces
decision makers to confront competing notions of the firm, and to
construct legitimating accounts of the firm-corporation relationship.
Decision makers should make these conceptions more explicit.
Further, the cases examined in Parts IV and V suggest that a
Coasian theory of firms and markets, and the firm-corporation nexus it
idealized, is more consistent with a "purposive approach"5 17 to work law
than one that equates the firm with the alleged employer's chosen
corporate identity. Judges harboring more Coasian notions of the firm
queried how the workers fit within a Coasian (or Taylorist) division of
labor. As discussed in Part III, several firm theorists presumed that
much of the transaction cost savings that firm production afforded were
from using a division of labor that differed from a market division of
labor. Both firms and markets coordinated a complex division of labor.
The specialization of tasks among individuals was a basic reason for
market exchange. However, the firm division of labor entailed a

look like software-there go the valuations. Second, a skilled labor force is
not an infinite labor force; the more skilled Turkers appear, the more a
microwork company may seem dependent on a limited labor pool rather than
on an infinitely replaceable pool of cheap labor.
Id. at 232.
515. See Jane Collins, Wal-Mart, American Consumer Citizenship, and the 2008 Recession, 61
FOcAAL 107, 112 (2011).
516. See Izvanariu, supra note 9, at 7-8.
517.

See Guy DAVIDOv, A PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO LABOUR LAW, 117-18 (1st ed., Oxford

Univ. Press 2016).
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separation of conception and management from execution.5 18 The
executors-those who carried out production rather than managing it or
conceptualizing it-contributed to production primarily in their ability to
work, or labor effort, rather than other ideational or material assets.5 19
The firm division of labor tended to reflect the relative property
contributions of participants.520
Companies "shedding" employment tend to acknowledge as part of
their organization only what they perceive as the high-valued added
work of conceptualization and management.521 In other words, they
shed execution, or refuse to acknowledge the workers executing
production as part of their enterprise. As explained in Part IV, within
the firm-corporation nexus authorized by Coasian theory, the social
warrant of the corporation was to facilitate the firm's centralized
coordination and thus business identity was to reflect the fruits of this
coordination-what was executed.522 When the alleged employers
asserted business identities that acknowledged only management and
conceptualization, but not execution-none of the fruits realized from
their appropriation of market processes-this often struck judges as
inappropriate.523 Without the execution, the companies could not be
productive enterprises. Thus, "the managing and performing functions
of furniture delivery result in a symbiotic relationship.
Without
providing physical delivery of furniture, which is essential to its
business, [the delivery company's] business would not exist., 524 And

518. Coase, Nature, supranote 4, at 400.
519. See id. at 400, 403-04.
520. Coase suggests the distinction between the firm and market division of labor, and he
intimates that the firm division of labor is derivative of a division of property. See id. at 403-04. He
describes the firm's authority to direct resources as an employment relationship. See id. In a
footnote, he tenders that firm production could involve control over another person's property as

well, rather than just their labor. See id. at 403 n.3. He then returns to employment as his central
illustration that his theory of the firm best resembles the "real world." Id. at 404. This suggests
employees do not control their own productive resources.
521. Not only is this a strategy of avoiding the costs of complying with work law, but it also
signals Wall Street that the company is "high tech" or "knowledge-based." See Irani, supra note
275, at 228.
522. See supra Part IV.
523. See, e.g., Prime Time Shuttle Int'l, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 838, 840 (Aug. 24, 1994) ("The
drivers clearly perform an essential part of Respondent's business. The business of the Respondent
is providing shared rides to the public and its vans and drivers perform that function. Driving is not
merely an essential part of Respondent's business it is Respondent's business.").
524. Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 11-1 1094-RGS, 2013 WL 3353776, at
*5 (D. Mass. July 3, 2013), opinion withdrawn in part 2015 WL 501512 (D. Mass. Feb 5, 2015),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded 813 F.3d 429 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Oliveira v. Advanced
Delivery Sys., Inc., No. 091311, 2010 WL 4071360 (Mass. Super. July 16, 2010)).
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courts will reject "a false dichotomy between the administrative and
operational aspects of their business."525 FedEx's business would "cease
to exist" without the delivery drivers to put its delivery network "to use."
The consonance of the Coasian understanding of corporate
legitimacy and the policy purposes of work law is that judges who
expect business identity to bear a strong relationship to the organization
of productive activity tend to focus on two features-the parties' relative
capital contributions (as opposed to whether the workers own any inputs
to production, however minimal) and on the level of skill required in the
work. 526 These factors-skill and relative capital contributions-help to
identify individuals within the intended policy scope of many labor and
employment statutes. 527 They help to identify a fount of unequal power
within the particular work arrangement and beyond that-unequal
ownership and control over productive property. This inequality is the
warrant for most statutory interventions into work relations, including
collective bargaining and minimum wage law.528 The pattern of
property relations within the enterprise generally extends beyond it to
the individual's class position. 5 29 While some Uber drivers assume the
undertaking for reasons other than necessity, one with more than labor
effort to sell generally does not enter an employment relationship but
instead negotiates a contract. 3 o
The focus on execution also tends to identify the "democratic
deficit," a policy concern of collective bargaining law and apparent in
several classic theories. In Alchian's and Demsetz's theory of team
production, for example, productive exchange takes place through
multilateral cooperation; but a central authority sets rules for input
providers, and the main contribution of most input providers is labor
effort.53 1 The executors generally lack the right to participate in
525.

Sebago v. Bos. Cab Dispatch, Inc., 28 N.E.3d 1139, 1148 (Mass. 2015).

526.

See STONE, supranote 156, at 2, 5.

527. Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee When It Sees One and
How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 301, 316-17, 349-51 (2001).
528. Id.
529. This is the basis of Hart's argument that employees stay with a firm even if it changes
ownership-the employees lack the firm's productive resources. See HART, supra note 129, at 57-

58.
530.

See Gibbons, supra note 457, at 187-89 (Gibbons is referring to the "make or buy"

distinction as the distinction between employment and independent contracting: "making" an input
to production means purchasing labor effort and non-labor inputs from different parties, whereas
"buying" an input means purchasing both from the same party. He suggests that one who has

control over resources that could be useful in production processes does not generally sell only labor
effort.).

531.

See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 143, at 778-81.
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determining the identity of manager or in other decisions about the
design of the productive process.532
This Article is not recommending that we adopt a Coasian
definition of employment, however.533 Scholars have critiqued the
traditional foci of tests for employment status "control," "economic
dependency," and "entrepreneurial opportunity"-for being unwieldy,
anachronistic, and disconnected from the policy and fairness objectives
prompting the inquiries in the first instance.53 4 Coasian firm theory may
offer a compass to assist in navigating these tests and redirecting them to
their policy purposes.
Given the near identity of the firm and
employment in several Coasian theories,535 defining employment in this
way would lead decision makers in circles: What is employment? It is a
firm. What is the firm? It is employment.5 36 Since Coase and other
major theorists defined the firm in opposition to contract-not merely an
incomplete contract, but a kind of anti-contract 537 -- Coasian theory's
most important contribution to debates over the legal identity of
employment is perhaps to highlight the awkward political status of
employment in a liberal legal order that claims to have successfully
transitioned from "status to contract."
Further, not all that is troubling about Uber is a consequence of its
legal arbitrage of the firm-corporation distinction and the Uber
narrative's spurious use of TCE. Some have observed that Uber's
532.

See Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A Characterizationof

Workers in Need ofProtection, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 357, 380 (2002).
533. Other scholarship focuses in particular on the employment status of Uber drivers and
other platform workers. See, e.g., Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 514, at 1675; Izvanariu, supra
note 9, at 1-2.

534. See STONE, supra note 156, at 3-4; Carlson, supranote 527, at 298-99.
535. Coasian theorists have discussed firms and markets interchangeably with employment and
independent contracting. See, e.g., Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 143, at 783-84; Coase, Nature,
supra note 4, at 391-92, 403-04 ("We can best approach the question of what constitutes a firm in
practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that of 'master and servant' or
'employer and employee."'). Scholars have recently brought needed attention to the role of
employment in firm theory. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Participationas a Theory ofEmployment,
89 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 661, 663, 695 (2013); see also Glynn, supra note 489, at 203-04; Brishen
Rogers, Toward Third-PartyLiability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 1, 28
(2010).
536. See, e.g., Final Order, supra note 43, at 19 (determining that Uber was a technology
company and not a transportation company based largely on its evaluation of other factors in the test
for employment status, such as the drivers' ownership of the cars). The agency noted, "[i]t could be
argued that these factors are somewhat circular because they turn on whether the work of the
Drivers is categorized as within Uber's employ. Indeed, it could be argued that, without users of the
Driver App, Uber has no independent service of value." Id.
537. See Coase, Nature, supra note 4, at 391; see also Williamson, Outsourcing, supra note
110, at 178.
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perfunctory and unilateral deactivation of drivers based on its
quantitative star rating system may be thwarting anti-discrimination
law. 3 Uber may be discriminating against drivers on the basis of race,
sex, religion, and other protected categories by acting on the
discriminatory ratings of passengers; for instance, if passengers tend to
give black drivers lower ratings.539 The problem here is not that Uber is
pretending to be a market mediator when it is a firm, but that in this case
It is allowing
it is acting more like a transparent intermediary.
exogenous demand preferences to shape supply. Contrast this to a
scenario in which Uber did not allow harmful customer preferences to
shape its supply of drivers, for instance, if Uber deactivated drivers only
for their noncompliance with Uber's work rules (vehicle cleanliness,
music, etc.). The concern is that by using a crude rating system to make
termination decisions, Uber is enabling markets for discrimination to
flourish.
E. The Algorithm
While Uber does not render the firm obsolete, more complex
algorithms expose the fragility of the entire Coasian foundation, also
suggesting that it is not one on which to build legal distinctions.
Sophisticated platform algorithms undermine the distinction
between centralized and decentralized coordination. In order to allocate
resources to their most valued uses, well-working markets are supposed
to have neutral, transparent, means of communication so that people can
make decisions about how to realize their preferences. Platforms using
sophisticated algorithms (e.g., Amazon's book reviews) purport to act
upon "raw" data, and to objectively order the vast amounts of this data
that whirls through a complex, modern world. 540 They are "trusted
information tool[s]." 54 1 Yet, they necessarily curate, censor, modulate,
and even create information, and do so according to their particular
logics. 54 2 Thus, when algorithms compute what we might like to buy,
538. See Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 172, at 11-14.
539. See Dallan F. Flake, Employer Liabilityfor Nonemployee Discrimination 11-13 (May 16,
author),
with
file
(on
manuscript)
(unpublished
2016)
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=2780677.
540. See Gillespie, supra note 404, at 169-70, 190.
541. Id. at 191.
542. See Kate Crawford, Can an Algorithm be Agonistic? Ten Scenes from Life in Calculated
Publics, 41 SC., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 77, 85 (2016) ("Algorithms may be rule-based
mechanisms that fulfill requests, but they are also governing agents that are choosing between
competing, and sometimes conflicting, data objects."). Platforms make choices regarding what
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read, see, etc ; algorithms poke and prod resources in certain directions.
The algorithm's nudging of resources blurs the distinction between
centralized and decentralized coordination.543 They challenge the ideal
of neutral information channels.
The deeper challenge that algorithms pose to Coasian theory,
however, is to challenge the assumption of exogenous preferences and
thereby deflate Coasian theory's claims about efficiency. The notion
that markets and firms can allocate resources to their most valued uses
implies exogenous preferences-preferences that are not determined
through interaction with, or participation in, firms, markets, or other
governance structures of economic activity. Exogenous preferences, in
theory, provide an outside reference point by which to evaluate whether
markets and firms allocate resources to their most valued uses.
Sophisticated algorithms, like those behind Google's search engine,
illustrate the endogeneity of preferences.'" Language and algorithms
are both communication mediums. The algorithm is a formula, but this
does not distinguish it from other mediums. Every communication
medium has a logic by which it structures and creates categories for
thoughts, desires, subjectivities, and knowledge production. 5 45 All
communication mediums take inputs and process them through formulas
to produce outputs. 54 6

We orient our expression to be legible within

them by standardizing our expressive capabilities so they can be
transmitted through these mediums. Thus, communication mediums
shape our subjectivities and preferences-our preferences are not formed
independently of these mediums. The fact that the algorithm is a
communication medium and communication mediums shape our
preferences need not in itself be fatal to the proposition that they provide
information enabling people to act on preferences formed outside the
market. What is rather fatal is the nature of the algorithm as a medium:
The algorithm is more "computational" than other means of
communication, such as the English language.5 47 Speaking through
algorithms-for instance, using TaskRabbit's interface or clicking
makes it into an index in the first place, what is excluded, and how data is made algorithm ready,
and must create criteria to evaluate what is relevant. See Gillespie, supra note 404, at 172-74. And
the algorithm ignores some information, selects other information, and "bluntly approximates"
some. See id. at 173-74.
543. See Crawford, supra note 542, at 80-82 (discussing Amazon's bestseller ratings for
books).
544. See Gillespie, supra note 404, at 182.
545. See id. at 178.
546. Id. at 167-169.
547. Id.
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through Amazon book ratings-imposes a different kind of logic on our
expressions than speaking with a friend on the phone. It is the logic of
the platform provider; it redounds upon our subjectivities when we speak
5 48
its computational language and it speaks back in this language.
Platforms may suggest that they are merely good at anticipating our
wants but do not shape them; however, algorithmic logic makes it
difficult to maintain that platforms simply transmit information enabling
individuals to act upon preferences formed outside of those platforms.
Until we recognize preferences are endogenous to these interactions, it is
difficult to find a vantage point from which to say markets are allocating
resources to their most valued uses.
VII.

CONCLUSION

All too often we lump different business models under the rubric of
the "platform" or digital marketplace without asking whether they have
549
Why are we
anything in common apart from using the internet.
Why do
Ebay?
like
just
market
a
facilitates
willing to believe that Uber
and
buyers
between
we more readily accept that Uber intermediates
sellers, but that a restaurant does not intermediate a market between
buyers of hospitality services (diners) and sellers (waiters)?
The Uber narrative speaks in the argot of Coasian firm theory, and
yet is largely nonsensical within it. Rather than reduce the costs of
market exchange between drivers and passengers, a Coasian analysis
suggests that Uber has lowered market costs between Uber, as a seller of
55 0
It suggests that ICTs can
transportation services, and passengers.
point of making firm
the
to
reduce intra-firm transaction costs
5 ' Thus Uber may be a poor
production cheaper than market production.
avatar of the platform economy. And ICTs may not be the solvent that
dissolves the firm into independent producers. Uber and Lyft's use of
ICTs gives workers more flexibility over scheduling their time. It also
enables the companies to subject workers to intensive supervision and
548. See id. at 172-73 (Gillespie argues that the platform creates the user as a "shadow bod[y]"
and an "algorithmic identity," and notes that, "such sites are comfortable catering to these user
caricatures," and "appear to sort us most sufficiently, particularly around our consumer
preferences... . And to some degree, we are invited to formalize ourselves into these knowable
categories. When we encounter these providers, we are encouraged to choose from the menus they

offer, so as to be correctly anticipated by the system and provided the right information, the right
recommendations, the right people.").

549. See, e.g., Bruner, supra note 1.
550. See supra Part III.
551. See supra Part III.
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authority. Within the Coasian perspective, Uber drivers look much more
like day laborers on digital street corners than independent businesses or
even other platform workers, like Upwork workers or Airbnb hosts.
In many cases, judges reject the business identities that companies
assert as incompatible with their conceptions of the legitimate
corporation, conceptions that closely resemble the ideals of Coasian
theory.
However, the institutions of capitalist accumulation are
changing in ways that defy ideal conceptions of the corporation and test
decision makers' commitment to them. And claims about technological
sophistication and the knowledge economy can be euphemisms for profit
seeking not through productive enterprise, but through regulatory
arbitrage, speculation, and other forms of asset manipulation. Subjecting
the Uber narrative to scrutiny under the lens of classic firm theory
reveals another face of a phenomenon often critiqued under the rubric of
financialization: Gestating within Uber's story about technology and
transaction costs is the "postindustrial corporation," a corporation that
seeks profit through means other than the efficient production and sale
of goods and services. 5 52
The idiom of advanced information
technologies can obscure the disjuncture between the theoretical ideal of
how firms and markets should work, and how they operate in practice.
Uber has not rendered the firm obsolete. The Uber narrative offers
ideological sustenance for another leg of capital's journey. towards
purification, liberation, and abstraction. Marx predicted one era in
which "agricultural capital" and "industrial capital" became simply
"capital." The Uber narrative heralds another, in which productive
enterprise appears as capital still "afflicted with local and political
prejudices; it is capital which has not yet extricated itself from its
entanglement with the world and found the form proper to itself-capital
not yet fully developed. "It must achieve its abstract, that is, it's pure,
expression in the course of its cosmogony." 5 53

552. See Tomassetti, It's None of Our Business, supranote 320.
553. MARX, supranote 283, at 39.
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